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For at least twenty years, a broad, bi-partisan consensus has prevailed regarding the goal
of U.S. antitrust policy: to foster competitive markets and to control monopoly power, not to
protect smaller firms from tough competition by larger corporations.  The interests of consumers
in lower prices and improved products are paramount.  When these interests are served by large,
efficient firms, even firms with substantial shares of well-defined markets, the consensus view is
that antitrust policy should applaud, not stand in the way.  However, when those large and
powerful firms wield their power to exclude rivals in unreasonable ways, antitrust policy should
act to preserve competition, both on prices and regarding product improvements stemming from
innovation.  Since the 1970s, these principles have been widely accepted, and antitrust law and
policy have fundamentally been about economics – promoting competition and consumer
benefits – not about broader social objectives such as favoring domestic firms, preserving
employment, or protecting small businesses.
Within these confines, antitrust policy turned more activist during the Clinton years than
in the prior Bush Administration, and sharply more active than during the Reagan
Administration. To the general public, the most visible symbol of this activism was surely the
Microsoft antitrust trial, which led in May 2000 to a dramatic court order (reversed on appeal in
June 2001) that Microsoft be broken up.  To practicing antitrust lawyers and academicians who
specialize in the field, the upturn in antitrust activity was evident in many more ways: in
challenges to several large corporate mergers, in the uncovering and prosecution of some largeLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 2
national and international price-fixing conspiracies, and in the many active investigations of
monopolization practices by dominant firms other than Microsoft.
To a significant extent, the enhanced activity reflected a more activist philosophy of the
officials in charge of the two major federal antitrust enforcement agencies -- the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) – than
was on display during the preceding twelve years. This was most clearly true of enforcement
activity directed at various business practices of dominant firms, although an observable shift
was also evident regarding certain proposed corporate marriages, especially in comparison with
the second term of the Reagan administration.
The Microsoft case illustrates one of the key shifts during the Clinton administration that
explains in part the more aggressive approach taken at the DOJ and the FTC: greater attention
was paid to long-term competition in the form of innovation, in comparison with the traditional
focus of antitrust on shorter-term competition, namely pricing.   We believe the increased
emphasis on innovation can be attributed to the confluence of two fundamental factors.
First, the 1990s covered a period during which new technologies had a marked impact on
a range of markets, with the Internet and information technology leading the way.  Increasingly,
the fruits of competition are seen in the form of new technologies which lead to new and
improved products.  At the same time, intellectual property rights, in the form of patents,
copyrights, and trade secrets, increasingly have become a key source of competitive advantage
for firms controlling such rights.   How natural, then, that antitrust authorities have paid more
attention to “innovation competition” and intellectual property rights.
Second, antitrust officials in the Clinton administration combined a willingness to predict
the medium- to long-term effects of mergers and various commercial practices, a necessaryLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 3
element of enforcing the antitrust laws in the area of innovation, with a confidence that they
could correct market failures in the realm of innovation.  Unlike traditional pricing competition,
the effects of which can be seen on a day-to-day basis and occur in the short-term, innovation
competition by its nature requires time to unfold and is far less amenable to quantification.
Hence, the underlying philosophy of antitrust officials can greatly affect their actions (or
inactions) in the area of innovation: the Clinton team’s activism can be traced to its greater
confidence regarding the ability of government officials to predict future outcomes in markets
subject to technological change, along with greater skepticism that markets will correct problems
over time and greater suspicion regarding the strategies employed by large or dominant firms.
Ultimately, the more active antitrust policy we have seen over the past eight years than
we saw in the previous twelve years can be traced to a greater confidence of Clinton appointees
in their ability to correct market failures by banning business practices and blocking mergers
thought to harm competition.   We fully expect to see a shift back to a more cautious antitrust
enforcement effort over the next several years, all within the boundaries of the broad consensus
described above.
We do not mean to suggest that a focus on innovation during the Clinton years in any
way distracted from the most traditional, and least controversial, aspect of antitrust enforcement,
namely the breaking up of cartels and conspiracies in restraint of trade.  To the contrary, the
Antitrust Division had unprecedented success during the Clinton years, and especially during the
second Clinton administration, in prosecuting price fixers.  We see this as an area where an
apparently small change in policy had a major impact.  The change in prosecutorial policy – little
noticed at the time – was the introduction by DOJ in August 1993 of a corporate amnesty
program.  Under the corporate leniency or amnesty program, immunity was granted for criminalLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 4
prosecution to the first participant in a price fixing or other collusive conspiracy to turn itself in.
This seemingly innocuous policy change helped identify some of the largest price-fixing
conspiracies ever uncovered, and eventually led to far and away the largest fines for antitrust
violations ever imposed.
Antitrust policy during the Clinton years also became much more international in scope,
both by necessity and design. The necessity arose from the greater frequency of cross-border
mergers and price fixing conspiracies brought to the attention of the American officials and their
foreign counterparts (in part because of the corporate amnesty program). Cross-border antitrust
cooperation – especially between American, Canadian and European antitrust enforcement
officials – also intensified, especially after the enactment by the Congress (at the urging of the
Justice Department and the FTC) of the International Antitrust Enforcement Cooperation Act of
1994. With few exceptions (such as temporary disagreements over how to analyze certain
mergers), the Clinton years marked a major advance toward enhanced international antitrust
cooperation. We forecast even more cross-border cooperation and interaction – and quite
possibly conflict -- among antitrust enforcement agencies in the years ahead.
The Clinton years also saw significant increases in the antitrust enforcement budgets of
both federal agencies. The increased resources allowed sizeable staffing increases among
attorneys, economists, and staff support.  In addition, DOJ in particular abandoned the prior
practice of having staff attorneys handle all antitrust trials, and for its major cases – notably
Microsoft, but also for certain other high-profile investigations – turned to highly experienced
private attorneys to supervise these assignments. This change in tactics brought greater expertise
to the prosecution of these cases and helped impart cutting edge trial skills to the government’s
permanent staff attorneys (who played major supporting roles in these trials and investigations).Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 5
The antitrust agencies during the Clinton years were also aided by state attorneys general
and private litigants who brought information to the enforcement officials, and in some cases
assisted with the prosecution of the cases. The increased involvement of the state attorneys
general, however, has been a mixed blessing, in our view, since more prosecutors can complicate
efforts to obtain prompt resolution of investigations, especially settlements that promise similar
results to litigation but can achieve them much more quickly.
Looking ahead, a key challenge confronting antitrust enforcement is how to adapt to the
increasingly rapid pace of technological change, with the concomitant expansion in the role
played by intellectual property. On the one hand, technological change can reduce the need for
prompt antitrust action, by eroding more quickly any market power held by dominant firms. On
the other hand, patents and copyrights can serve as significant barriers to entry.  We fully expect
the enforcement agencies and the courts to continue to explore the antitrust limits on the use or
abuse of intellectual property.   The challenge of fashioning antitrust policy in a world of rapid
technological change is heightened by the presence of “network effects,” primarily demand side-
side economies derived from compatibility, in some high–tech markets.  Network effects, in
conjunction with intellectual property rights, can result in durable market power even in the
presence of rapid technological change.  A firm that achieves dominance by taking advantage of
network externalities – a perfectly lawful vehicle – may be able to thwart challenges from new
competitors and technologies by having large numbers of existing customers “locked-in” to the
use of existing products and services.  As a result, barriers to entry to new competitors can be
significant in high-tech markets.  In such situations, heightened antitrust scrutiny is needed to
ensure that dominant positions are not being abused.  Complicating the antitrust response,
however, is the fact that the judicial process – even with quick disposition of pre-trial motions,Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 6
expedited discovery and trial – is often slower than ongoing market developments. How to deal
with this disjunction between “technology time” and “judicial time,” so evident in the Microsoft
case, is likely to be one of the central challenges to antitrust enforcement in the future.
We assume that readers of this chapter will come to the material with varying levels of
background in antitrust. For those with relatively little experience in the subject, we begin by
outlining the basic antitrust laws in Section 2, and the agencies that enforce them in Section 3;
these Sections can be skipped by those already familiar with the basics of antitrust law and
enforcement procedures.  We then proceed in Section 4 to provide a brief history of antitrust
enforcement, concentrating especially on the two decades preceding the 1990s. This discussion
provides the predicate for the heart of the chapter, the discussion of the Clinton antitrust
enforcement record.  After an introduction to the Clinton record in Section 5, we explore the
three key areas of antitrust enforcement: criminal prosecutions (Section 6), civil non-merger
enforcement activity (Section 7), and review of mergers (Section 8). We then provide a
discussion of the increased level of international cooperation and extraterritorial enforcement of
U.S. antitrust laws in Section 9. We conclude in Section 10 with our assessment of the Clinton
antitrust record and by offering some thoughts about the future of antitrust, intellectual property,
and high-tech.
We caution readers at the outset that each of us brings to the subject our own experiences
at the Antitrust Division at DOJ during two separate periods of the Clinton era, along with our
private-sector experience on specific cases.  We acknowledge that this has the potential for
introducing bias, and because we are aware of this possibility, we make great efforts to avoid it
by discussing the issues in what we believe is a neutral manner. How successful we are in this
effort is for readers to judge.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 7
2.  Some Basics of Antitrust Law
Antitrust law in the United States dates from the passage in 1890 of the Sherman Act,
which prohibited contracts, combinations, conspiracies in restraint of trade (Section 1) and
actions taken to monopolize or attempt to monopolize markets (Section 2). Almost a generation
later, the Congress added the Clayton Act of 1914, which, among other things, prohibited (a)
firms with dominant power in one market from forcing consumers to buy entirely different
products (tying); (b) competing firms from having overlapping boards of directors; and (c)
mergers between firms that threatened to substantially reduce competition in any line of
commerce.
1  In the 1930’s, Congress supplemented these two basic statutes with the Robinson-
Patman Act, aimed at preventing firms from charging different prices to different customers that
were not based on costs (i.e., from engaging in price discrimination) when such pricing harmed
competition. The Robinson-Patman Act, roundly criticized, has rarely been enforced by the
government in the past twenty years.  Indeed, selective price discounting has for the most part
come to be welcomed by antitrust authorities.
2  Most states have their own versions of one or all
of these federal statutes, and so do most other industrialized countries, including Australia,
Canada, Europe and even Japan.
Broadly speaking, the antitrust laws punish conduct designed to impair the competitive
process –  that is, conduct likely to lead to higher prices and restricted output relative to a state of
unfettered competition -- not the economic fortunes of individual firms.  Of course, as a practical
matter, information about potential violations often is brought to the attention of the enforcement
authorities (discussed in the next section) by competitors of possible antitrust violators. The
antitrust proscriptions can and often are categorized in different ways.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 8
One categorization, for example, distinguishes among the proscription of collective
conduct aimed at restraining competition (price fixing, bid rigging, dividing markets among
competitors, boycotts, and the like); unilateral conduct (acts designed to entrench or establish a
monopoly that have little or no legitimate business purpose and that are only profitable because
of their tendency to exclude competitors); and mergers, which very often pose no threat to the
competitive process (and often enhance it by producing more efficient combinations) but in some
cases so reduce the number of players in a market that the most likely result is higher prices or
reduced innovation after the merger is consummated (in which case the merger almost certainly
will be challenged by one, or several, antitrust agencies).
Another common distinction is based on the different penalties that apply to antitrust
violations, at least in the United States. Where juries are able to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that two or more companies have conspired to restrain commerce, the law provides for
criminal penalties: fines and potentially incarceration of the individuals involved. As a practical
matter, criminal prosecutions tend to be brought primarily by the Justice Department, and then
only for forming cartels to fix prices (perhaps the most naked form of anti-competitive conduct)
or divide markets.  Where the agencies, or private parties, cannot meet the high criminal standard
of proof, antitrust violations are punishable by judicial decrees ordering the end of the offending
conduct and actions that may resemble it (in cases brought by the government), by disgorgement
of the unlawful gains from the violations (if the FTC has brought the action), or by treble
damages to victims of the offensive conduct (in cases brought by private litigants). Unlawful
mergers, meanwhile, can be prevented or undone by the courts; more often, they are restructured
(often with divestitures of certain assets or activities) as part of a negotiation with the antitrust
agencies. Other countries have different antitrust penalties. Notably, European Union lawLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 9
provides for no criminal sanctions; enforcers typically resort to fines and/or injunctions against
the offending conduct. Furthermore, while private antitrust lawsuits are available in Europe, they
are not nearly as common as they are in the United States.
A final distinction that antitrust specialists often draw is between conduct that is deemed
to be a per se violation and conduct that is judged under a “rule of reason.” The notion of per se
offenses has been developed by the courts over time to eliminate the need for extensive proof of
the anti-competitive effect of certain conduct that, on its face, has been determined to lack any
legitimate justification, regardless of how much market power the actors may possess. Examples
include such collective conduct as fixing prices, dividing markets, and a narrow range of group
boycotts and tie-in sales.  In virtually all other cases, courts take a case-by-case approach when
examining the alleged unlawful behavior, requiring the plaintiff(s) to prove that the conduct, on
balance, does more harm than good to the competitive process.
The standards for assessing the competitive impact of mergers have also become clearer
over time with the development and refinement of Horizontal Merger Guidelines by the DOJ and
the FTC, which set forth the methodology enforcement officials use to decide whether to
challenge particular business combinations involving direct competitors.  Although these
decisions must still be made case by case, antitrust practitioners and the courts have come to
value the use of a common framework for understanding and assessing these decisions – in
particular, standards for defining the “relevant” markets in which the effects of the merger will
be assessed and measures of market concentration – that are likely to effect whether the merger
will be judged to lead to higher prices or reduced innovation, thus justifying a challenge.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 10
3.  Antitrust Enforcement Procedures and Institutions
In the antitrust chapter of the last exercise of this kind – the volume edited by Martin
Feldstein for the National Bureau of Economic Research that assessed economic policy in the
1980s -- one of the then leading academic authorities in this field identified the courts as the key
institution for developing, articulating and enforcing at least the federal antitrust laws.
3 Because
the words of the antitrust laws are inherently vague – and seemingly so all-encompassing – there
is a sense in which this must be right. All contracts, for example, “restrain” trade; it has been left
to the courts to identify which types of contracts do so unlawfully. The same applies to other
“magic” words in the antitrust laws, such as “monopolization.”
In practice, however, as in so many other areas of the law, the day-to-day decisions about
enforcement are made by government antitrust law enforcement officials – primarily at the
federal level, but also in the states.
4 Moreover, beyond appointing the key antitrust officials – the
head of the Antitrust Division at Justice and the Members of the Federal Commission – the
President and other members of the Executive Branch play essentially no role in day-to-day
antitrust enforcement. On broad policy issues, it is possible that the President and his advisers
may voice their views, but even these occasions are rare.
The key enforcement decisions are whether to launch an investigation, and then whether
to file a formal legal complaint. Typically, right before formal action is taken, however, officials
give targets of their investigations their “last rites”: a final chance to settle, analogous to a plea
bargain in the criminal context. In fact, it is our experience from serving in the DOJ during the
Clinton years that most serious antitrust investigations are settled without a formal trial; this is
one reason that we believe so much enforcement power is actually lodged in the prosecutors.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 11
At the same time, however, there was a discernible shift in the willingness of the DOJ, in
particular, to settle or litigate – at least between the two Clinton terms. Settlements were more
the rule than the exception during the tenure of Anne Bingaman, the first Clinton Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust at DOJ, for all types of antitrust matters. Both the Department and
the FTC became more willing to litigate, at least with respect to some high profile matters,
during the second term, under the direction of Joel Klein, the second Clinton appointee as
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, and at the FTC, under the Chairmanship of Robert
Pitofsky.   In part we attribute this to the desire of Joel  Klein and Robert Pitofsky to establish
legal precedents, not “merely” to fix particular competition problems in specific matters that they
happened to come across.  As we shall see, both the DOJ and FTC met with mixed success when
their cases were actually subjected to rigorous review by a trial court (and in several cases,
appellate review as well).
This brief commentary highlights the fact that antitrust enforcement jurisdiction at the
federal level is split between Justice and the FTC. This dual responsibility is unusual, but not
completely atypical. In the tax field, for example, both the IRS and DOJ share jurisdiction. The
same is true for civil rights enforcement, which is shared by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the DOJ. In the antitrust field, the FTC was created by in 1914 because of a
perception then that DOJ was insufficiently aggressive in pursuing antitrust violations. Over the
years, the two agencies have informally divided enforcement responsibility by industry – DOJ
has handled airlines and telecommunications matters, for example, while the FTC has specialized
in the oil industry and pharmaceuticals – but in many cases there are overlaps. Where that
occurs, responsibility is divided on a case by case basis, although sometimes with tension
between staff or political appointees. We witnessed such tension during our tenure at DOJ, butLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 12
found it to be the exception rather than the rule, and usually most pronounced in high-profile
cases such as the AOL/Time Warner merger where each agency could claim real industry or
company expertise.
As we have noted, most states have antitrust statutes that parallel one or more of the
federal statutes. This gives enforcement authority to state attorneys general.  In the past, the
states for the most part confined their antitrust enforcement activities to prosecuting local price-
fixing conspiracies, often against competitors in bid-rigging schemes.  During the 1990s,
however, the states began to play a much higher profile role, not only bringing matters to the
attention of the federal agencies, but also seeking a share of litigation responsibilities, as
occurred during the Microsoft trial during the second Clinton term. One of the interesting
developments to look for during the next Administration not only is whether the federal antitrust
agencies will become less activist in any sense (a subject we address at the end of the chapter),
but if they do, whether and to what extent to which the states will take up any of the slack by
becoming more aggressive.
The 1990s also saw more cooperation between U.S. and foreign antitrust agencies,
especially the European Union. This was due in large part to two factors: the EU significantly
strengthened its merger enforcement procedures in the early 1990s, and the 1990s witnessed an
increased number of mergers involving parties on both sides of the Atlantic, thus giving EU
enforcement officials jurisdiction over the transaction along with U.S. officials. Except in rare
cases (notably the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas and the General Electric-Honeywell mergers), the
U.S. and EU agencies viewed transactions very similarly, with the EU taking the lead in some,
the U.S. agencies in others.
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Since the Clayton Act of 1914, the U.S. antitrust laws have allowed – many would say
encouraged – private parties injured by antitrust violations to sue for damages. Under Section 4
of the Clayton Act, winning plaintiffs are entitled to three times the amounts by which they can
prove they were injured,
6 a provision that provides very strong incentives for private litigants and
their attorneys to investigate potential violations, and thus equally strong incentives for firms and
individuals subject to treble damages to avoid violations of the antitrust laws.
We would like to emphasize the uniquely strong character of the U.S. system as regards
financial penalties imposed on companies violating the antitrust laws.  The U.S. has put into
place a powerful combination of forces operating to benefit private antitrust plaintiffs: private
antitrust cases are permitted and involve treble damages; private plaintiffs have extensive
discovery rights; plaintiffs can demand a jury trial; and lawyers representing a class of plaintiffs
often face a low hurdle to have their proposed class action certified.   Antitrust hawks see these
pro-plaintiff rules as a great virtue of the U.S. system.  Others believe that the U.S. system allows
plaintiffs’ lawyers to extract substantial sums of money from corporations that have done
nothing to violate the antitrust laws.
The unflattering view of private antitrust enforcement in the U.S. runs roughly as
follows:  lawyers for antitrust plaintiffs face a very low hurdle to obtain class certification.  Once
a class is certified, defendants face the possibility of a very large damages award (after trebling),
such as claims based on over-charges from an alleged conspiracy.  Plaintiffs then benefit from
extensive rights to discovery of defendants’ files and data, which often turns up at least a few
unflattering statements or e-mails, perhaps written by low-level employees.  These documents, in
conjunction with the less-than-favorable views held by some jurors about large corporations, and
the willingness of jurors to infer that a conspiracy may exist even absent direct supportingLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 14
evidence, imply that a perceived risk to the defendant of an adverse jury decision exists in
virtually any case.  Given this risk, many executives will be inclined to pay substantial sums of
money rather than face a jury trial, even if they are confident that their company’s conduct has
not harmed competition.  The net result is that many private antitrust lawsuits of dubious merit,
imposing a type of tax on corporate America.  Of course, there is an obvious counter-argument:
U.S. laws empower an army of private antitrust enforcers who collectively have a pronounced
effect on improving compliance with the antitrust laws, thus stifling cartels and preserving
competitive markets.
In any event, the dual nature of antitrust enforcement – government actions against
companies that violated the antitrust laws along with private actions to collect damages – leads to
various complex interactions between public and private enforcement, for a number of reasons.
First, because antitrust litigation can be so expensive – especially when launched against
defendants with deep pockets – private litigants often bring their complaints to the government
and wait for official prosecutions in court, either civil or criminal, to provide proof of a violation.
With such judgments in hand, as a practical matter private plaintiffs rarely need to prove more
than damages.  In part for this reason, defendants that are targets of government antitrust
investigations often settle by signing consent decrees, which involve no admission of unlawful
conduct but simply agreement to change conduct in some manner to meet the government’s
objections. In such instances, private plaintiffs must therefore prove that a violation has occurred
as well as any damages they might have suffered.
Second, because of the importance of private antitrust actions in the U.S., confining
attention to government enforcement actions, much less federal government enforcement actions,
does not give a complete picture of the antitrust landscape.  Enforcement of the antitrust laws isLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 15
more stable over time than is reflected in federal antitrust policy, in part because of lags between
federal activity, subsequent court decisions, and the resulting payoffs to private plaintiffs in
antitrust actions.
Third, federal antitrust policy tends to have a multiplier effect: targets of antitrust
investigations understand well that a lawsuit with federal officials (or even a settlement, which
then becomes public) will almost invariably trigger one or more private antitrust lawsuits.  Since
private actions can involve hundreds of millions of dollars (see below where we discuss the
prices fixing cases involving the NASDAQ and the auction houses), increased enforcement
activity by the FTC and the DOJ very quickly sends a message to companies throughout the
economy that they are at real risk if they do not stay on the safe side of the line currently being
drawn by federal antitrust officials.
4.  Historical Cycles in Antitrust Enforcement
Before considering the antitrust enforcement record of the Clinton Administration in
some detail, it is useful first to place it in some historical perspective. Accordingly, we review
here very briefly some of the developments and waves in federal antitrust enforcement in
particular over the last century.
7  These cycles in enforcement reflect shifting views over time in
public attitudes toward business as well as scholarly thinking about the appropriate role of
government intervention in the market with the aim of ensuring competition. Although in the last
several decades there has been convergence among antitrust legal scholars and economists on the
basic structure prosecutors and courts should use for analyzing markets, differences in views
remain.  It is these differences that account for the continued fluctuations in antitrust
enforcement philosophy and activity that persist to this day.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 16
Given the vagueness of the first antitrust law, the Sherman Act, the courts spent
considerable time in the first few decades after the Act was passed giving content to the meaning
of words like “contract in restraint of trade” or “monopolization.”  Broadly speaking, the courts
condemned only those contracts under Section 1 of the Act where direct rivals agreed to restrict
output and raise price, or in other words, agreed to act like a monopolist.
8 The Supreme Court
also condemned “vertical” agreements by manufacturers and their retailers on minimum prices
above which retailers would sell.
9
After some early cases in which the Supreme Court tolerated mergers that produced large
or even dominant firms – examples being the Sugar Trust, General Electric, International
Harvester, du Pont, Eastman Kodak, U.S. Steel and Standard Oil – the Court in 1904 finally
blocked the merger between the Northern Pacific and Great Northern railroads on
monopolization grounds. Seven years later, the Court found that Standard Oil had achieved
monopoly status with 90 percent of the market for refined oil products and abused its dominance
by various forms of exclusionary conduct (all thoroughly documented in Ron Chernow’s Titan).
The following year, the Court handed down another anti-monopolization decision in Terminal
Railroad Association of St. Louis, holding that various railroads could not use their control over
terminal facilities at a main crossing of the Mississippi River to discriminate against rivals. Both
Standard Oil and Terminal Railroad would be widely cited as important precedents in the Justice
Department’s anti-monopolization case brought against Microsoft in the 1990s (discussed
below).
The monopolization cases of the early 1900’s proved to be a temporary high water
market for antitrust enforcement, however, as the next decades saw a movement by prosecutors
and courts to adopt case-by-case “rule of reason” standards for assessing wrongdoing. The shiftLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 17
in attitude was due to several sources: a widespread consensus after World War I that
cooperation between business and government was a good way to organize the economy; a
strong sentiment after the Depression began in 1929 that prices were too low rather than too
high; and a narrow interpretation by courts of the antitrust enforcement mandate of the Federal
Trade Commission (created in 1914 in response to fears of excessive concentration of
enforcement power in the Executive branch).
The enforcement cycle turned in a different, more aggressive direction by the mid-1930s
and continued on this path until the early 1970s.  Interestingly, the shift in direction was
prompted by Chicago-school economists – Henry Simons, Jacob Viner, and Frank Knight – who
argued that that economic planning was not getting the United States out of the Depression and
that antitrust enforcement was needed to de-concentrate American industry.
10  Antitrust
enforcement against various forms of collusive behavior – price-fixing, tying, non-price vertical
restraints, group boycotts, and exclusive sales territories-- was revitalized and eventually
condemned by the Supreme Court using per se rules. In contrast to a rule of reason standard, per
se rules required proof only that the conduct took place, not of its anti-competitive effects. The
courts also became more willing to find fault with excessively aggressive behavior by dominant
firms, most notably in the famous Alcoa case in 1945, when Judge Learned Hand found that the
preemptive addition of capacity by a firm with most of the aluminum market was wrongful.  In
subsequent cases, the Supreme Court condemned a locally dominant newspaper’s effort to
destroy a small radio station by refusing to sell its advertising (Lorrain Journal Co. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 143 [1951]);  prevented the “lease only” policy of the United Shoe Company,
which dominated the market in shoe-making equipment (eventually authorizing the breakup of
the company); and found a nationally dominant bakery’s localized price cuts to be wrongfulLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 18
(Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 [1967]). With the exception of Lorrain
Journal and the price fixing and tying cases, it is not clear that many of the others would be
brought by enforcement officials (or supported by the courts) today.
Antitrust enforcement also became much more aggressive against corporate mergers,
inspired by the “structure, conduct, performance” paradigm associated with Harvard economist
Joe Bain, which posited a strong correlation between even relatively low levels of market
concentration and industry profitability, and thus potentially anti-consumer outcomes.  In a series
of decisions in the 1960s, in particular, the Supreme Court approved government challenges to
horizontal mergers (those among competitors in the same geographic and product markets)
whose combined market shares would fall well below those that would be challenged now.
Indeed, in a famous dissent in Von’s Grocery (384 U.S. 270, 301 [1966]), in which the majority
condemned a merger that would have generated a market share of only 7 percent in a generally
unconcentrated market, Justice Potter Stewart summed up the prevailing judicial environment
then with the declaration: “the Government always wins”.
Beginning in the 1970s, the three-decade long pattern of antitrust activism began to
attract strong criticism from various law professors and economists associated with the
University of Chicago (where a previous generation of scholars, as just indicated, ironically
helped launched the very trend that this newer generation of scholars attacked). Among other
things, the Chicago School critique was leveled at the Supreme Court’s per se rule against non-
price vertical restraints (which were argued to be pro-competitive), and at the Court’s various
merger decisions for failing to define markets accurately or for stopping transactions without
proof of competitive harm. Over time, more judges were appointed to the federal bench whoLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 19
were sympathetic to this line of argument, including Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook, who
were prominent contributors to the Chicago School critique of the earlier antitrust policy.
As a result, by the 1980s, the federal courts began to grow more skeptical of antitrust
cases. Moreover, with the notable exception of the breakup of AT&T – where the evidence was
clear that a dominant company had abused its market power – and various prosecutions against
bid-rigging, government antitrust authorities became much more reticent to mount antitrust
challenges of all types. The shift in attitude was also reflected in personnel and resources,
especially at the Department of Justice, where the number of attorneys was significantly reduced
through much of the 1980s.  This trend began to be reversed under James Rill, the Assistant
Attorney General during the Bush Administration of 1989-1992.  As noted above, antitrust
enforcement resources were augmented throughout the two Clinton terms.
Although the Clinton antitrust appointees became more aggressive in pursuit of antitrust
violations of various types, it is fair to say that a “post-Chicago” synthesis has emerged,
reflecting a significant degree of consensus among antitrust scholars and practitioners on two
key items. One important area of agreement is on the framework used to analyze mergers,
especially to define markets, which were totally revamped during the first Reagan term (under
the guidance of Assistant Attorney General William Baxter). As we discuss below, the so-called
“Horizontal Merger Guidelines” have since been revised under both the Bush and Clinton
Administrations, but the revisions have been more in the nature of tweaking – and certainly not
rejecting – the initial framework. The second area of agreement is that collusive activities are to
be punished. As we discuss below, one of the important features of the Clinton antitrust years is
how many large price fixing conspiracies were uncovered or investigated, often international inLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 20
scope. To us, this development was a surprise. Prior to coming to the Justice Department, neither
of us would have suspected how extensive collusive practices turned out to be.
5.  The Clinton Antitrust Record: Introduction
A. Measures of Enforcement Activity
Antitrust enforcement activity can be measured and described. Here we do both, first by
presenting some summary statistics from the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department that
confirm the overall impression of increased activity during the Clinton years. The data only
begin, however, in 1991, and thus provide an incomplete picture of enforcement in the pre-
Clinton era. Nonetheless, we will accept the conventional wisdom that the numbers of
investigations and cases initiated in the 1980s was below that of the 1990s and thus use the data
primarily to concentrate on the latter decade when the Clinton antitrust team was in place. In
addition, the data reported here are only for Justice Department cases, not those launched by the
FTC.  We do not believe this limitation is significant, however, since both DOJ and the FTC
during the Clinton years shared similar antitrust enforcement philosophies.
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The pictures are shown in Charts 1 through 4 and pretty much speak for themselves.
Chart 1 illustrates that although the simple number of criminal prosecutions filed in court
actually declined somewhat from a peak in the early years of the 1990s, the magnitude of fines
collected jumped sharply, especially toward the end of the decade. As we discuss shortly, this
pattern reflects increased priority given by the DOJ to large national and international price-
fixing conspiracies, leaving local bid-rigging cases to be investigated and prosecuted by the
states.
Charts 2 and 3 illustrate the significant increase through much of the decade in both
categories of civil non-merger cases – restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act andLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 21
monopolization cases under Section 2 – that the DOJ has brought and won. These charts clearly
evidence heightened activism on both these fronts during the Clinton era.
Chart 4 shows a more uneven pattern for merger enforcement activity. While the numbers
of mergers requiring notification under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (any combination involving
an entity with more than $15 million in assets) increased throughout the decade, the percentage
of those mergers that were actually investigated seriously rose briefly and then fell back by the
end of the decade. Even more strikingly, the percentage of mergers actually challenged was
small – less than one percent of the total – and relatively stable throughout the period. The falling
share of mergers investigated most likely reflects the fact that even with more staff, the antitrust
agencies had to ration their time in light of the substantial increase in the numbers of mergers at
least to be preliminarily reviewed.
The low and stable share of mergers actually challenged reflects several aspects of
merger enforcement.  First, the DOJ was cautious in merger enforcement, insisting upon a solid
factual and theoretical basis before bringing a challenge.  Second, the Antitrust Division was
inclined through much of the period to reach agreements with the parties to solve anti-
competitive problems through divestitures of assets in markets where post-merger concentration
was deemed to be excessive, or through consent decrees restricting the activities of the combined
entity to prevent any future anti-competitive effects.  Third, and perhaps most important, is the
fact that companies contemplating a horizontal merger or acquisition can predict with reasonable
accuracy how their proposed merger will be received at the DOJ and the FTC, based on the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  In other words, with enforcement policy well articulated,
surprises at DOJ’s enforcement stance, as well as the need for Court review to draw the line, are
both relatively rare.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 22
Numbers and trends provide only a glimpse of the true nature of antitrust enforcement
activity. For a more in-depth look, we need to delve into some of the more important cases and
developments surrounding them. We do that in the four subsequent sections of this paper.
B. Guidelines and Hearings
Since so few antitrust cases actually involve litigation, much less an actual trial, a great
deal of antitrust policy is set through either consent decrees (settlements) or through the
enforcement guidelines that the agencies publish to inform the business community of their
policies.
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Probably the most influential antitrust guidelines are the Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
which are issued and followed by both the Justice Department and the FTC.  These “Merger
Guidelines” were totally reworked in 1982 under the first Reagan administration, then revised in
1992 under the Bush Administration. The only change in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
during the Clinton years was the release in 1997 of an expanded explanation of how the agencies
will treat efficiencies, namely the ability of the merged company to achieve lower costs, or
improved product performance, as a result of the merger.  While in principle the new treatment
of efficiencies is more generous to merging companies than were the prior guidelines,
practitioners generally believe that both agencies continue to apply a rather tough “screen”
before they credit a merger with real efficiencies.  In particular, both agencies are wary of
efficiency claims that will not in fact be achieved, or that would be achieved even without the
proposed merger.  Only efficiencies that are “merger-specific” are given any weight.
Three major new sets of guidelines were issued during the Clinton administration.
13  First
came the  Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, issued in 1994 (later
revised in 1996), which explain, among other things, how physician networks will be treated.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 23
Second were the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, issued in 1995,
which have been highly influential in mapping the role of antitrust policy in high-technology
industries.  Third came the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, issued
in 2000, which address the very complex issues that arise when direct rivals seek to cooperate in
various ways such as to set standards or participate in joint ventures.
In addition to these Guidelines, Chairman Pitofsky revived an old tradition at the FTC of
holding hearings on important current antitrust topics. Two sets of hearings stand out as offering
rich and valuable information on topical issues: (1) Hearings in 1995 that led to a staff report,
“Anticipating the 21
st Century: Competition Policy in the New High-Tech Global Marketplace,”
issued May 1996; and (2) hearings held June 29-30, 2000 that led to a staff report, “Competition
Policy in the World of B2B Electronic Marketplaces,” issued in October 2000.
C. Competition Advocacy
The DOJ and the FTC have long played advisory roles, essentially acting as advocates
within the federal government on behalf of market competition.  As part of the executive branch,
the DOJ (often along with the Council of Economic Advisers) takes the lead as the competition
advocate in the context of inter-agency discussions, from trade issues to privatization to a range
of regulatory issues.  Both agencies also serve as sources of expert advice to Congress regarding
legislation that has implications for competition and monopoly.
The DOJ played an especially large role in the developments and negotiations that led to
the Telecommunication Act of 1996.  DOJ’s role was natural because the Act was intended, in
part, to replace the Court oversight of the Bell system, itself arising from the 1984 consent decree
between AT&T and the DOJ, with regulatory oversight and deregulation.  In particular, DOJ
officials met regularly with other Administration officials, led by Vice President Gore, onLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 24
legislative strategy while the Act was being considered by the Congress.  In addition, just prior to
the Act’s enactment, the Department negotiated a waiver of the consent decree to allow
Ameritech to enter the long-distance market in Chicago, as a trial. The District Court never
issued a ruling on the waiver, however, because the Act preempted that experiment. Nonetheless,
many of the conditions set forth in that waiver for entry by the Regional Bell Operating
Companies (RBOCs) into long-distance telecommunications – largely relating to the openness of
the local markets to effective competition -- found their way into Section 251 of the Act.
In addition, the Act gave DOJ a special advisory role to the Federal Communications
Commission on RBOC applications for entry (although the Department and the Administration
had initially sought more – actual joint decision-making authority). Throughout the second
Clinton term, DOJ took a relatively hard line on RBOC applications for permission to enter long-
distance markets, recommending to the FCC denials in several cases because, in the view of the
Department, the RBOC applicants had not sufficiently opened up their own local markets to
competition, as required by the 1996 Act.  Nonetheless, by the end of the Administration, even
DOJ’s opposition started to soften. DOJ recommended, and in December 1999 the FCC agreed,
to allow Bell Atlantic (now Verizon) entry into long-distance in New York. The following year,
the FCC permitted SBC to enter long-distance in Texas. Shortly after the Bush Administration
came to office, in early 2001, the FCC granted Verizon’s long-distance application in
Massachusetts, and as this is written, it is widely expected that the FCC quickly will open up
many more states to RBOC entry into long-distance service.
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DOJ also cooperated closely in the mid-1990s with the Securities and Exchange
Commission during the investigation by both agencies into price-fixing by securities dealers on
the “bid-ask spreads” on certain highly traded stocks listed on the NASDAQ (a case discussedLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 25
below). While the DOJ included in its consent decree with the dealers an injunction against
certain practices that had the effect of facilitating collusion, the SEC also took important
regulatory actions that compelled disclosure of “limit orders” (orders to buy or sell at, above, or
below specific prices) that also helped ensure that collusion among market makers would not
take place.
6.  Cartel Enforcement in the Clinton Years
DOJ was extremely active during the Clinton years in investigating and prosecuting cases
against companies and individuals involved in price fixing and bid rigging. While there is broad
agreement across the political spectrum that such activities should be vigorously pursued, the
Department in the two previous administrations had concentrated its enforcement activities in
significant part on price fixing and bid rigging in limited geographic areas. The Clinton years
saw a major pickup in enforcement uncovering not only national, but international, conspiracies,
resulting in incarcerations of key company executives, record fines, and in the civil area, some
major changes in the way key industries did business.
A. Criminal Price Fixing
The Antitrust Division got off to a very poor start in its battle against price fixing with an
embarrassing loss in the case against General Electric for price fixing in industrial diamonds.
The Government believed that a major reason for its failure was its inability to compel testimony
of key foreign witnesses and to obtain documents abroad.  The latter problem helped motivate
the Department to seek broader authority to cooperate with antitrust prosecutors in other
countries, discussed below.  In any event, the DOJ’s setback in the GE case was not a portent of
things to come.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 26
To the contrary, as shown in the charts already referenced, the DOJ imposed far greater
fines for price fixing during the Clinton administration that had ever been assessed before.  Gary
Spratling, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in charge of Criminal Enforcement, was widely
recognized for his expertise in guiding the Department’s enforcement effort, aided by the
amnesty program discussed above.
15  Table 1 lists the price fixing violations leading to fines of
$10 million or more.
The citric acid and lysine cartels, which included Archer-Daniels Midland (ADM), led
the way in FY97.  ADM paid a fine of $100 million, at that time by far the largest such fine ever
assessed.  Total fines collected in FY1997 were $205 million, some five times the previous
record.  This number was exceeded in FY1998 with total fines of $265 million.  Then, in
FY1999, a breathtaking $1.1 billion in fines were obtained.  During that year, the single largest
fine ever assessed, $500 million, was imposed on Hoffmann La-Roche in the vitamins price
fixing case. This case involved an international cartel that operated from 1990 through 1999
covering certain vitamins used in human food, animal feed, and pharmaceuticals.  The graphite
electrodes case led to fines of over $400 million.
These are merely the most visible of the many price fixing and bid rigging cases brought
by the DOJ, ranging from school milk and highway bid rigging to electrodes.  As noted earlier,
more and more cases had an international scope.  Cases against Canadian producers of plastic
dinnerware and Japanese manufacturers of thermal fax paper cases provide additional examples
in this regard.  We return below to discuss more specifically the international component of
cartel enforcement.  The U.S. has been quite successful in exporting its version of cartel
enforcement to other countries, with the exception that other countries remain unwilling to make
price fixing a criminal violation.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 27
To put these fines in perspective, the annual fines during the previous Bush
administration (1990-1992) ranged from $20 million to $24 million.  During the first Clinton
administration (FY1993-FY1996), the annual fines collected ranged from $27 million to $42
million.  From FY1997 through FY1999, the Division collected over $1.5 billion in fines, of
which over 90% was based on international cartel activity.
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Clearly, there has been a sea shift, with cartel enforcement more effective and more
active than in recent memory.  While it is unlikely that these dramatic numbers could be
sustained under any administration, there is no doubt that cartel enforcement activity remains
high.  The most visible recent price fixing case is against the auction houses of Christies and
Sotheby’s.  This case received a great deal of media attention, both because it occurred in the
rarified world of art auctions in New York and because it lead to a shakeup at both auction
houses.  Sotheby’s has already agreed to pay a $45 million fine, and in May 2001 a grand jury
indicted the former chairmen of both auction houses.
B. Civil Price-Fixing Cases
There were also some very prominent civil price fixing cases brought by the DOJ during
the Clinton years.  While the penalty and deterrent – imprisonment – is plain for criminal price
fixing cases, readers might wonder what penalty is associated with civil price fixing cases, where
the companies involved typically agree to cease the alleged price fixing, a “sin no more” remedy,
and perhaps some additional “fencing in” provisions designed to prevent related antitrust abuses
in the future. An important part of the answer comes in the form of follow-on private antitrust
actions.  Virtually every DOJ case triggers a private case, in which customers asserting
overcharges seek treble damages.  These cases can be enormously costly to the companies
involved.  For example, in the NASDAQ case immediately following, the brokerage housesLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 28
ultimately agreed to pay nearly $1 billion to settle the private cases that followed on DOJ and
SEC enforcement actions.
The NASDAQ dealer case stands out as a signature case during Anne Bingaman’s tenure.
In this case, the DOJ alleged that the major brokerage houses had agreed to limit competition by
only quoting NASDAQ stocks in even eighths, thus ensuring that spreads would not be any
smaller than one-fourth.  This investigation involved close cooperation between the DOJ and the
SEC which was simultaneously bringing its own enforcement action against NASDAQ dealers.
The NASDAQ case raised some very interesting issues of evidence (tape recordings of dealer
conversations), focal point theories (odd eighths vs. even eighths), the role of academic research
(an academic paper by Professors Christie and Schultz of Vanderbilt University initially brought
this to the attention of the DOJ and SEC), and appropriate remedy (regulation vs. antitrust).  The
final remedy agreed to by NASDAQ, which led to an SEC rule opening up the “limit order”
books, has had a revolutionary impact on the exchanges, as already noted.
A similar if less visible case involving the various exchanges that trade options involved
an alleged agreement among the four options exchanges not to engage in multiple-listing at
different exchanges of so-called “grandfathered” options.
17  These grandfathered options were
ones that had previously been exclusively assigned to individual exchanges by the SEC during an
era when the SEC actively discouraged competition among exchanges, preferring instead that all
trading take place at a given location.   This case provides an interesting example of prior
regulation being lifted and competition taking a long time to take root.
7.  Civil Non-Merger Cases in the Clinton Years
The civil non-merger antitrust enforcement effort covers several types of possible
violations: unlawful conduct by dominant firms, or monopolies; unlawful cooperation amongLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 29
competitors (so-called horizontal conduct); and unlawful activities between firms in different
levels of commerce, such as prices imposed by manufacturers on retailers (vertical conduct). The
Clinton antitrust team was active on all these fronts, and we review the major efforts here.
A. Monopolization Cases: Microsoft, Intel and American Airlines
Antitrust cases challenging the unilateral conduct of dominant firms are among the most
controversial, although they also resonate well with a large body of the public, which sometimes
distrusts the activities of monopolies.  Nonetheless, a major reason for the controversy is that
antitrust attacks on dominant firms inevitably involve challenges to the businesses practices of
some of our most successful firms.  These criticisms are not new: they were heard when the
government challenged Standard Oil, Kodak, Alcoa, IBM, and AT&T over the decades.
During the Clinton era, the most visible targets of antitrust activity in general were
investigations or cases brought against the largest, most powerful firms.  We explore three such
cases in this sub-section: Microsoft, Intel, and American Airlines.  But readers should recognize
that several less visible monopolization cases were also brought against smaller companies who
nonetheless were viewed as dominant in their own spheres by the DOJ or the FTC.  These
include DOJ’s 1996 case against General Electric regarding GE’s licenses for medical imaging
equipment software, DOJ’s 1999 exclusive dealing case against Dentsply, the leading supplier of
artificial teeth, and the FTC’s 1998 case against Mylan Laboratories regarding two anti-anxiety
drugs.
1.  U.S. v. Microsoft
As we hinted at the outset, the Clinton antitrust years probably will be most remembered
for the DOJ’s continued investigation and ultimately its court action taken against Microsoft for
conduct the Department asserted constituted unlawful abuse of monopoly power.
18 Although the
litigated case during the second Clinton term brought by Joel Klein was the most visible effort inLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 30
this regard, the DOJ in the first term settled a less sweeping investigation with the company
under the direction of Anne Bingaman. Because of its importance, we summarize here some of
the key  issues from the perspective of each side and then provide our own assessments of each
of them. These issues are not unique to Microsoft, but also pose a challenge to competition
policy generally with respect to high-technology industries.
19 We include arguments and relevant
decisions up through the Court of Appeals decision in July 2001, which upheld much of the
district court’s original ruling, but reversed it in part.
20 At this writing, it is possible the case will
be settled; if not, then the litigation – primarily relating to the appropriate remedy – will
continue.
  From the government’s perspective, the following propositions seemed evident and well
supported by the evidence in the trial (a judgment the Court of Appeal essentially confirmed).
First, Microsoft has a clear monopoly over desktop operating systems and that monopoly is
protected by the “applications barrier to entry,” which makes other operating systems (such as
the Apple OS or Linux) far less attractive because many fewer applications are written to run on
those operating systems: this is network effects in action.  Second, Microsoft saw a threat to its
operating system in the form of the Netscape browser combined with Sun’s Java, which together
offered the promise of “cross-platform” middleware that would provide a neutral platform to
which applications could be written, thus paving the way (in a two-step entry process) for other
operating systems to overcome the applications barrier to entry. Third,  Microsoft acted during
1995-1998 at least to eliminate the threat to its monopoly by engaging in a series of practices
with the intent and effect of limiting the distribution and use of Netscape’s browser and of Sun’s
Java.  These practices, such as exclusive dealing arrangements and tying, involved the use of
Microsoft’s monopoly power over operating systems to stifle the adoption of Netscape and SunLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 31
software. Microsoft realized that it would be sufficient to prevent these middleware products
from becoming ubiquitous and thus serving as an alternative platform that could “commoditize
the operating system.” Finally, as a result of Microsoft’s conduct, consumers were deprived of a
chance to pry open the Microsoft monopoly, which instead persists.  While we do not know just
how competition would have played out in the absence of Microsoft’s conduct, we do know that
one major threat to the monopoly (and these do not come along all that often) was eliminated
through conduct that did not lead to benefit consumers, and thus cannot be construed as
competition on the merits.
Microsoft challenged each of the government’s propositions and counters with those of
its own.  First, the company argued that the software industry is extremely dynamic and fluid,
making any monopoly power fleeting and insignificant.  Microsoft asserted that it was forced to
price competitively because of a multitude of threats that are ever-present, since there can be no
monopoly over software programming skills, which is all that is needed to design and sell an
operating system.  The so-called “applications barriers to entry” allegedly is a fiction:
applications companies often write software for multiple platforms and would readily do so if
those platforms offered superior value to the Microsoft operating system.  For example, the
Apple system runs a great deal of software, and in fact Microsoft itself ports Office to the Mac
OS.  Second, Microsoft argued that Netscape and Java were not any unique threat to the
company, and in fact did not even constitute a rival operating system as such.  Netscape was a
competitor in providing browser functionality, but did not offer a substitute to Windows. Third,
Microsoft maintained it had done nothing more than innovate, improving the functionality of the
operating system by incorporating browser functionality into Windows.  This is a natural
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Internet and computer networking has become important.  Microsoft saw the government’s
attack on its design decisions for Windows as a direct attack on Microsoft’s ability to innovate in
ways that clearly benefit consumers. Finally, Microsoft claimed there was no consumer harm
from any of its conduct, pointing to the fact that Netscape in fact achieved widespread
distribution, and Internet Explorer has been able to gain share (against Netscape’s initially
dominant position) only by offering superior functionality and by leading the way in making its
browser available for free.  All of this has led to significant consumer benefits, in the company’s
view.
So, how did these respective arguments play out, in the District Court and ultimately at
the Court of Appeals?  We consider each argument in turn, beginning with the first point,
whether or not Microsoft has monopoly power.  No doubt Microsoft software has improved over
time; no doubt, either, that the mere cost of writing an operating system is modest in comparison
with Microsoft’s market capitalization (in the hundreds of billions of dollars) and perhaps even
in comparison with the annual revenues from Windows.  And Microsoft’s pricing for Windows –
which Microsoft said indicated that entry was an ever-present threat – presented something of a
puzzle for the government.  But many antitrust economists would agree that Microsoft’s durable
and very high share of sales of personal computer operating systems, in conjunction with the
compatibility issues that hinder Apple and Linux (for example), give Microsoft meaningful
monopoly power.  And the trial record left little doubt that Microsoft wielded significant power
over personal computer makers such as Gateway or Compaq, who have no practical alternative
to Microsoft if they want to actually ship personal computers to their customers.  In short,
software markets, like some other high-technology markets, involve a different set of entry
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manufacturing facilities or trade restrictions.  In June 2001, the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia (CADC) upheld the District Court’s conclusion that Microsoft did indeed have a
monopoly over desktop operating systems.
What about the second point – whether or not Netscape and Java posed a real threat to
Windows?  Here we get into some of the thorniest issues in “high-tech antitrust.”  We may
imagine as a general principle that a high-tech company – monopoly or not – will be better
placed than antitrust officials to identify at an early stage the threats to its position.  Especially in
software, which is inherently so malleable, the greatest threat may not come from a frontal
assault, but rather from a complementary product that can be transformed into at least a partial
substitute over time.  Let us suppose that the high-tech monopolist, seeing a possible threat, acts
to block it before it matures into a full-fledged and “obvious” direct threat.  Surely sound
competition policy cannot conclude that such behavior is immune from antitrust challenge
merely because the threat was immature at the time it was eliminated.  And surely it makes
sense, as a matter of enforcement policy, to give considerable weight to the company’s own
documents and views about the likely market evolution.  But is it equally clear that predictions of
market effects will be very difficult if the threat is in its early stages and the market is inherently
dynamic.  Thus we have an unavoidable policy dilemma: if antitrust officials act early to prevent
the incumbent from eliminating the threat, they will necessarily have a difficult time showing
definite harm to competition; but if they wait until the harm is shown, it will be too late to correct
the problem and far less likely to deter such conduct in the future.  On this issue, the Court of
Appeals came down squarely on the government’s side, ruling that “..it would be inimical to the
purpose of the Sherman Act to allow monopolists free reign to squash nascent, albeit unproven,Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 34
competitors at will – particularly in industries marked by rapid technology advance and frequent
paradigm shifts.”  (CADC, p. 61)
The third point – evaluating the actual economic effects of Microsoft’s conduct – suffers
the same problem just described with respect to the identification of anti-competitive effects.
This problem has always been present in monopolization cases, although it is arguably
exacerbated in the high-tech setting.  The most heated debate revolves around the government’s
claim that Microsoft “tied” Internet Explorer to Windows.  Many commentators harbor
considerable unease about having the courts “second guess” product design decisions, even those
by dominant firms.  And the antitrust law revolving around tying has always had problems
stemming from the necessity of defining just when two “functions” constitute two separate
“products,” which can be tied, rather than a single product.   All of the long-standing thorny
issues surrounding the law of tying are brought into sharp relief when software is involved, since
the boundaries of one piece of software, or one piece of code, and another are inherently hard to
define.  In fact, the Court of Appeals remanded the District Court’s tying decision against
Microsoft, indicating that the application of a per se rule was inappropriate here, but offering the
government the chance to make its tying case again using the rule of reason, which would
require a balancing of the exclusionary effects and the beneficial effects of Microsoft’s tying of
Internet Explorer to Windows.
There is less debate surrounding Microsoft’s contractual practices, such as exclusivity
provisions in various contracts, although even there the effectiveness of these contracts to
actually impede Netscape was hotly disputed.  The Court of Appeals fully supported the District
Court’s ruling that Microsoft violated the Sherman Act by defending its monopoly using
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Finally, we face here the tricky question of whether Microsoft was defending its
operating system monopoly or attacking Netscape’s browser monopoly (or both).  If we take
network effects and compatibility seriously, as Microsoft clearly does, Netscape’s browser posed
a threat to Microsoft precisely because it was the dominant browser, and thus an attractive
“platform” to which other software could be written.  Thus, by attacking Netscape’s “monopoly”
– something normally encouraged under the antitrust laws – Microsoft was eliminating a threat
to its own monopoly – actions which can amount to illegal “monopoly maintenance.”  Indeed,
Microsoft documents indicate that Microsoft’s primary goal was simply to match Netscape in
browser share, not necessarily to “win” the browser war.  Viewed this way, and looking for
general principles beyond this particular case, limits on the conduct of one incumbent monopolist
can potentially strengthen the position of another incumbent monopolist.  The Court of Appeals
fully accepted the findings of the District Court that Microsoft engaged in “monopoly
maintenance” by preventing Netscape’s browser and Sun’s Java from gaining sufficient
acceptance to become an alternative software “platform.” Furthermore, the Appeals Court held
that it was an act of monopolization for Microsoft to meld the computer code for the browser and
the operating system, given the potential of the browser (plus Java) to become a competing
platform for a wide range of applications programs. As a practical matter, this part of the
appellate ruling means at the very least that Microsoft must enable consumers and computer
manufacturers to remove Internet Explorer from Windows. At this writing, one state (New
Mexico) has settled with Microsoft requiring just that outcome.
In sum, the June 2001 Court of Appeals decision sends a clear message, especially since
is was written by a 7-0 Court: high-technology companies are not immune from antitrust
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is no more than a slap on the wrist – an outcome we consider unlikely in the light of the appellate
ruling -- we believe few dominant companies in the future will want to take on the legal risks,
and face the public relations problems, that Microsoft has endured by acting so aggressively in
wielding its economic power.  Whatever happens next, we believe that the legacy of the
Microsoft case is clear: powerful companies, even in industries experiencing rapid technological
change, must compete on the merits, not by using their power to exclude competition, even
competition offered by nascent technologies.
2.  FTC v. Intel
The case brought against Intel by the Federal Trade Commission in 1998 is a useful
contrast to the Microsoft case.
21 When Intel was faced by patent infringement suits by some of
its customers (Intergraph and Digital being the leading examples), Intel withdrew certain
valuable Intel intellectual property (including trade secrets valuable to customers building
systems incorporating Intel microprocessors) from those customers.  The FTC viewed this
conduct as a monopolistic abuse by Intel, since these customers would suffer significant
economic harm if deprived of the Intel intellectual property.  The FTC took the view that Intel
should not be able to engage in “self-help” to resolve patent claims brought against it, but rather
should resolve such claims in court.  Intel viewed its conduct as a natural defensive response,
refusing to share its intellectual property with companies that were bringing their own
intellectual property cases against Intel.
The parallels between the Microsoft and Intel cases are clear enough: Intel, like
Microsoft, is a powerful company in the personal computer business; Intel, like Microsoft, sells a
critical component (microprocessors) of personal computers and has a very large share of the
sales of this component.  Intel, like Microsoft, has enjoyed this large share for years.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 37
But the similarities end there.  The Intel conduct challenged by the FTC was very narrow,
confined to Intel’s response in situations in which an Intel customer sued Intel for patent
infringement.  Intel’s conduct was directed at certain customers, not at Intel’s competitors (such
as AMD, Intel’s primary competitor in making x86 compatible microprocessors, or IBM and
Sun, two of Intel’s leading competitors in making microprocessors for servers).  Unlike the
Microsoft case, the FTC never identified any evidence that Intel was attempting to do anything
more than defend itself, and reduce its exposure, in the face of patent infringement cases brought
against it.   Nor was the FTC able to point to any adverse effect of Intel’s conduct on competition
in microprocessors.  The final difference is the disposition of the two cases: shortly before trial,
Intel settled its case with the FTC, agreeing to partially alter its business practices to meet the
FTC’s concerns.  The Intel case is now seen as a leading example of the boundary between
intellectual property and antitrust, as well as a good example of how a leading company can
minimize its antitrust exposure by compromising with antitrust enforcers.
Both the Intel and Microsoft cases illustrate the willingness of Clinton antitrust officials
to make predictions about how specific business practices will affect competition well into the
future.  In the Microsoft case, the DOJ necessarily was predicting that Netscape’s browser and
Sun’s Java could, in time, have posed a genuine threat to Microsoft’s monopoly position.  One
reason the government case was so strong in Court is that Microsoft itself took precisely this
view.  Some would say that Microsoft over-reacted to the Netscape/Java threat, but who was
better placed to judge the severity of the threat than Microsoft itself?  Clearly, the efforts of
Microsoft executives to distance themselves from their own earlier documents and e-mails
undermined their credibility with Judge Jackson.  In the Intel case, the FTC predicted that Intel’s
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innovation to challenge Intel’s position in microprocessors.  But again we see the importance of
the documents and internal assessments of the company itself: the FTC had an underlying theory
but virtually no evidence, either from Intel or from third parties, in support of their position.
Intel’s own documents showed that it was fighting back in the context of patent litigation in an
effort to limit its exposure to patent infringement suits.  Intel’s stated objective was to reduce the
royalties it might have to pay and thus lower its costs.  And Intel’s actions were primarily
directed at its customers, not its competitors.
What lessons can we learn from these two signature cases at the intersection of antitrust,
intellectual property, and high-technology?  The lesson for powerful companies subjected to
antitrust scrutiny is clear: they must be prepared to defend themselves based on their
contemporaneous assessment of their own actions combined with economic analysis of the likely
effects of those actions, not based on a reconstruction of why they pursued the strategies they
did.  The lesson for antitrust officials: court challenges to the conduct of dominant firms based
on predictions about future effects on competition and innovation are unlikely to have much
force without a solid evidentiary basis for those predictions combined with a sound economic
theory of harm to competition.
3.  U.S. v. American Airlines
A third monopolization case stands out from the Clinton years: the predatory pricing case
brought against American Airlines in 1999 by the DOJ. The government challenged American’s
strategy of cutting prices on flights into and out of its Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) hub in response
to competition from new entrant airlines seeking to serve certain spokes out of that hub.
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What was remarkable about the American Airlines case is that the DOJ sued even though
there was no evidence that the airline was pricing below average variable cost or marginal cost,
the conventional test for assessing whether predatory pricing was present that is applied byLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 39
courts, as recommended by antitrust scholars Philip Areeda and Donald Turner. The government
nonetheless asserted in its complaint that American Airlines intended to drive new entrants out of
business with extraordinarily low fares and expected success precisely because marginal costs in
the industry – the cost of filling an additional seat on an airplane -- were so low.
23  In late April
of 2001, however, the federal district court in Wichita, Kansas that was hearing the case threw it
out on summary judgment, in effect affirming the Areeda-Turner test.  As a result, predatory
pricing law remains where it was before the American Airlines case was brought.
24  In our view,
it is unlikely we will see many such cases in the future.
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B. Horizontal Activity
Whatever one may believe about the wisdom of government challenges of conduct by
dominant firms, there is much more consensus among antitrust scholars and practitioners that the
government should be vigilant in prosecuting various types of horizontal, or collusive,
arrangements to fix prices and divide markets. Nonetheless, even this consensus can break down
when confronted with the facts of particular cases. The Clinton antitrust years were marked by
some rather novel investigations and prosecutions of horizontal conduct, not merely plain vanilla
price fixing. A review of the most notable efforts follows.
1.  DOJ’s Credit Card Case
DOJ sued Visa and MasterCard in October 1998 for their rules regarding dual
governance and exclusivity.  Dual governance refers to the fact that many of the banks in control
of Visa also play a lead role in running the MasterCard system.  Exclusivity refers to the rules
that prohibit banks that are members of Visa or MasterCard from issuing rival cards such as
American Express or Discover.  DOJ asserted that dual governance and exclusivity had impeded
competition among and innovation by credit card systems (such as Visa, MasterCard, American
Express, Discover).  A trial was held in the Summer of 2000 in this case. The district court judgeLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 40
who heard the case expressed some skepticism during the trial about some of the government’s
positions.  Her decision was pending at this writing.
2.  FTC Cases Challenging Patent Settlements by Drug Companies
Starting in 1999, the FTC moved aggressively to challenge agreements reached between
incumbent companies holding pharmaceutical patents and would-be challengers offering generic
drugs.  Several of these cases display variations on the same fact pattern.  First, the challenger
files with the FDA for permission to introduce a generic version of a popular branded drug.
Next, the incumbent supplier, who holds a patent, asserts that the challenger would infringe the
patent, which (under the Hatch-Waxman Act) freezes the generic challenger for 30 months while
the patent infringement issues are sorted out in court.  Then the incumbent and the challenger
reach a settlement, which specifies a date at which the challenger is licensed to enter the market.
The FTC has objected strongly when these patent settlements involve a cash payment
from the patent holder to the challenger.  The FTC asserts that incumbents are effectively paying
to delay the entry by the generic challenger, thereby depriving consumers of the benefits of
generic competition, which typically involves much lower prices than are charged by the branded
incumbent supplier.  In some cases, due to the operation of the Hatch-Waxman Act, a settlement
between the patent holder and the first company to file with the FDA to offer a generic can also
freeze other generic suppliers out of the market.  The FTC has filed several of these cases, and
has opened a broader industry investigation into this type of settlement agreement.
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3.  Patent Pools
As intellectual property becomes a more and more important element of competition, the
antitrust limits on agreements involving intellectual property loom larger in the antitrust
enforcement world.  The FTC generic drug cases just described fit into this category.  So does
the Intel case, which was in many respects about cross-licensing: Intel would not license itsLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 41
patents trade secrets unless the licensee also shared its intellectual property with Intel.  As
explained in Shapiro (2000), the surge in patenting activity has created a “patent thicket” that
companies must cut through to commercialize products in a number of high-tech industries,
inevitably leading to more licensing and cross-licensing activity.
Patent pools are yet another type of intellectual property agreement.  Under this form,
two or more companies contribute their patents to the pool, which then licenses out a package of
patents to companies seeking to manufacturer products using those patents.  Patent pools have
long raised red flags in antitrust circles, as they can easily involve an agreement on pricing (at
least to set the price charged by the pool)  between actual or potential competitors.
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The Clinton Justice Department was quite supportive of patent pools, with suitable
protections.  The DOJ recognized that pooling the complementary patents necessary for a
product or technology can be highly pro-competitive.  In theory, forming a patent pool can lower
licensing costs for two reasons: by offering convenient, one-stop shopping for licensees whose
products make use of several patents, and by internalizing the “Cournot complements” problems
that leads to inefficiently high prices when two complementary monopolists price their products
(or patents) independently.  Using this sound economic reasoning, DOJ issued favorable business
review letters for a patent pool involving the MPEG video compression technology and for two
patent pools involving DVD technology.
In contrast, the FTC took a distinctly more hostile approach to patent pools, challenging
the patent pool formed by Summit and VisX, the two key suppliers of technology for laser eye
surgery.  Despite the fact that Summit and VisX appeared to have held complementary blocking
patents  (this being the standard used by the DOJ for allowing the formation of a pool), the FTC
challenged their pool, Pillar Point Partners.  In the Summit/VisX case, the parties agreed toLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 42
abolish their pool and give each other royalty-free cross-licenses.  While this served the short-run
interests of consumers, the FTC approach may discourage the formation of efficient and pro-
competitive patent pools in the future, and may discourage innovation by failing to give
sufficient returns to innovators who must deal with others holding complementary blocking
patents.
4.  Standard Setting
The FTC’s case against Dell Computer articulated an important principle regarding the
use of intellectual property in the standard-setting process: after Dell had agreed not to assert any
patents against other companies for the purpose of complying with a certain hardware standard,
Dell indeed tried to assert such patents.  The FTC challenged this practice, and Dell agreed not to
assert its patents on this standard.  The key principle here is that companies must meet the
promises they make in a standard-setting context with respect to the licensing of their patents
necessary to comply with the standard.  For a further discussion of the antitrust treatment of
standard-setting activities, see Shapiro (2000).
8.  Merger Control Policy During the Clinton Years
For reasons having nothing to do with antitrust policy, there was a massive merger wave
during the mid- to late-1990s.  The merger wave washed over large sections of the economy,
ranging from banking to telephones, from defense to health care, from railroads to radio.
Inevitably, many of these mergers involved dominant firms, or direct competitors, and thus
triggered antitrust review.   As shown above in Chart 4, the number of Hart-Scott-Rodino merger
notifications received by the FTC and the DOJ more than tripled from the early 1990s to the late
1990s.
28  Even more dramatic was the increase in the value of U.S. merger activity.  During the
1990-1992 time period, the average annual value of U.S. merger activity was $151 billion.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 43
During the 1998-1999 time period, this average had jumped more than tenfold to $1.7 trillion.
While some of this increase reflects the overheated stock market valuations of 1998-1999, the
real economic value of merger activity clearly rose dramatically during the 1990s.  Naturally,
this put more pressure on the resources of the DOJ and the FTC and increased their crucial role
insuring that mergers and acquisitions do not substantially reduce competition.
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We find it notable, however, that the rate of challenges of mergers as a percentage of
HSR filings (again, see Chart 4) did not rise significantly from the early 1990s to the late 1990s.
In fact, despite the huge number of mergers proposed and consummated, virtually none of these
mergers were challenged and litigated on antitrust grounds.  In large part, the dearth of litigation
reflects a clear articulation of merger control policy – less uncertainty means less litigation.  In
no year were more than 6% of proposed mergers subjected to a full investigation (second request
for information); in no year were more than one-half of one percent of proposed mergers
challenged in Court.  And, in the vast majority of deals that were modified as a result of the HSR
review, these modifications (usually divestitures) were achieved through a settlement with  the
DOJ or the FTC.
We also should note a reality of today’s capital markets: few companies are prepared to
fight in Court a DOJ or FTC challenge to their merger: the ensuing litigation inevitably takes
several months, if not more, during which time the target company is likely to suffer, both in
terms of its stock price and in terms of its ability to operate effectively.  As a result, merging
parties often abandon their mergers once DOJ or the FTC makes it clear that a challenge will
ensue and if the agency’s requirements to “fix” the deal are unacceptable to the merging parties.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 44
A. The Predictable Nature of Merger Enforcement Policy
We attribute the low level of merger litigation in no small part to the relatively
predictable nature of merger enforcement, at least as regards horizontal mergers, following the
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  Recall that the guidelines have been largely in place now
for nearly 20 years.  In other words, the small amount of litigation should not be taken as
indicating that antitrust policy was somehow lax or irrelevant.  To the contrary, companies are
continually counseled on which proposed mergers will pass, or fail, antitrust scrutiny.  In this
very real sense, merger control policy has an ongoing, profound if largely hidden effect on the
very structure of American industry.
As noted above, the economic principles behind merger control policy have not shifted
since the Reagan administration.  Rather, the differences across administrations have been one of
judgment and emphasis.  For example, in the Reagan years, antitrust officials were quite
receptive to “entry arguments,” namely arguments put forward by merging parties that they
could not exercise market power post-merger because any attempt to do so would be met with
easy and rapid entry into the market.  Clinton administration officials also acknowledged that
entry can eliminate concerns, but have tended to require much more solid evidence of ease of
entry before giving significant weight to these arguments.
There has been one clear shift in merging thinking throughout the 1990s.  Early on, the
primary theory used by lawyers at the DOJ and FTC was a collusion theory: after the merger,
with one fewer player in the market, the remaining suppliers would find it easier either to form a
cartel (explicit collusion) or simply to adopt “live and let live” strategies (tacit collusion) rather
than to compete actively and aggressively.  By the mid-1990s, an alternative theory, known in
antitrust circles as “unilateral effects,” became much more common in merger analysis.  This is
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of Nash Equilibrium) after the merger would involve reduced output and higher prices than
before the merger.  Based as it is on non-cooperative oligopoly theory, unilateral effects analysis
is highly amenable to economic modeling and estimation.  As a result, the emphasis on unilateral
effects has led to a great expansion in the role of oligopoly theory and econometric analysis in
merger review.  This is especially true in cases where there is considerable data available, such
as mergers involving consumer goods where supermarket (or comparable) scanner data is
available.  Some of the most detailed empirical work on differentiated products, pricing, and
oligopoly now takes place in the context of merger analysis, in part because economists
conducting such analysis have exceptional access to detailed company records as well as high-
frequency, disaggregated price and quantity data.
B. General Approach to Remedies
We did see some general shifts in the approach taken at the FTC and the DOJ regarding
three broad classes of merger “remedies”: (1) blockage of the merger; (2) requiring the merged
firms to divest certain assets to preserve competition (a so-called “structural” remedy); or (3)
requiring the merged entity to operate its business subject to certain limitations (a so-called
“behavioral” remedy).
As a general rule, both agencies have long been unwilling to enter into behavioral
remedies in horizontal mergers.  For example, an agreement to lower prices 5% per year after the
merger would typically not be accepted as a substitute for pre-merger competition between the
merging parties.  Underlying this view is the judgment that the benefits of competition cannot be
replicated through consent agreements: perhaps competition would lead to much better products,
or to prices falling at a rate greater than 5% per year.  Concerns about enforceability also argue
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In contrast, behavioral remedies are often accepted in vertical mergers.  For example, in
the Time Warner/Turner merger, the FTC accepted a commitment by Time Warner to provide
access on the Time Warner cable systems to either MSNBC or Fox News, the two leading
competitors to CNN, which was part of Turner Broadcasting and was being acquired by Time
Warner.  This behavioral remedy was intended to address the concern that Time Warner might
use its cable properties to exclude rivals to CNN from obtaining needed cable distribution.
Returning to horizontal merger cases, where divestitures are the typical remedy, there still
remains the question of how big a package of assets much be divested.  The operative rule at
both agencies is that the divestiture should create a viable competitor so that there is no
significant loss of competition in comparison with the pre-merger state of affairs.  In most cases,
the competitive vitality of the divested assets depends both on the package of assets that is
divested and the identity of the company acquiring those assets.  For example, in the proposed
acquisition of Intuit by Microsoft, which the DOJ asserted would have reduced competition in
the market for financial software (Intuit’s Quicken competed against Microsoft’s Money), the
divestiture offered by Microsoft was rejected by the DOJ.  Simply spinning off Money (even if a
full package of assets had been offered) was inadequate, since it was unlikely that any firm
picking up the Money assets would be as strong a competitor in the financial software market as
Microsoft was viewed to be prior to the proposed merger.
The implication: before accepting a divestiture remedy in a merger case, antitrust
officials not unreasonably are interested in knowing not just what assets will be divested but also
the likely identity of the firm acquiring the divested assets.  On this score, we observe the DOJ,
and especially the FTC, taking a tougher stance in the second Clinton term than during the first.
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conclusion that certain “partial” remedies had not been as effective as hoped.  The unavoidable
policy conclusion: divestitures should be more complete, and the FTC should make sure that the
buyer of any divested assets will be a highly capable competitor in the relevant markets at issue.
In shorthand, the prevailing approach during first term was to accept surgical fixes, while a
“clean sweep” of assets was more likely to be required during the second term.  Leading
examples in which the agencies required the divestiture to be a full-fledged, viable business on
its own were Exxon/Mobil, BP/Amoco, BP/ARCO, Time Warner/Turner, and Worldcom/MCI.
C. Major Merger Challenges
We cannot do justice here to the many mergers investigated and challenged during the
Clinton years.  Rather, we will simply mention a handful of the more visible cases at each
agency, with very brief commentary on the substance of these cases, what they tell us about
merger enforcement policy during the Clinton years, and their implications for future merger
enforcement.
1.  Department of Justice
The Antitrust Division challenged Microsoft’s acquisition of Intuit in 1995.  Intuit’s
Quicken financial planning software was a direct competitor to Microsoft’s Money software.
Microsoft and Intuit abandoned the deal prior to litigation.  This case shows the DOJ rejecting
arguments that entry barriers into software markets are inevitably low, and viewing Microsoft as
a strong force capable of adding significant competition in an area where Intuit was the leader.
The case also shows an unwillingness of the DOJ to accept a partial divestiture of Money assets
by Microsoft.
In 1996, the Division urged the Surface Transportation Board (STB) not to approve the
proposed merger between the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific railroads, two of the three
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econometric work to define relevant railroad markets and the impact of competition from
trucking and waterborne freight transportation.  The DOJ also expressed skepticism over the
large efficiency claims put forward by the merging parties.  The STB approved the merger over
DOJ objections.  After the merger, Union Pacific experienced very substantial disruptions to its
operations – effectively an anti-efficiency.  Later, following a complex deal by which CSX and
Norfolk Southern split up Conrail, the STB imposed a ban on railroad mergers, which was only
lifted by the Bush administration in the Summer of 2001.  This case shows how resting final
authority over mergers in the STB, rather than DOJ, is likely to lead to a more lenient policy, just
as it did during the 1980s when the Department of Transportation approved several airline
mergers over DOJ objections.
DOJ challenged several hospital mergers during the first Clinton term, but was less active
in controlling hospital mergers after facing several defeats in Court, including a 1994 setback in
the merger of the only two hospitals in Dubuque, Iowa, Mercy Health Center and Finley
Hospital, and a 1997 defeat in the merger of Long Island Jewish Medical Center and North Shore
Health System.
Throughout the Clinton administration, and especially after the passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Antitrust Division was faced with a series of proposed
mergers in the telecommunications sector.   The radio industry experienced a wave of
consolidations, with the DOJ (not the FCC) serving as the gatekeeper limiting concentration of
radio assets in various cities.  Likewise, DOJ faced several huge telephone mergers, including
SBC/Pacific Bell, SBC/Ameritech, Bell Atlantic/Nynex, Bell Atlantic/GTE, and Qwest/U.S.
West.  Generally, DOJ approved these mergers with relatively minor divestitures or other
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(RBOCs), such as Bell Atlantic and Nynex, either were not significant potential competitors in
each other’s regions or that the merging parties were only one of several potential competitors.
One telecom merger in which the DOJ required a significant divestiture was the merger between
Worldcom and MCI in 1998: the DOJ required the sale of a major MCI unit to preserve
competition in Internet backbone services.  Various antitrust observers have noted that
preserving competition among the various underlying pipes which comprise the Internet – itself
often viewed as a technology that breaks down entry barriers and enables wide-open competition
– requires vigilant antitrust enforcement.
During the second Clinton term, several very large mergers or acquisitions were
abandoned in the face of DOJ challenges: Alcoa and Reynolds in aluminum (1997); Lockheed
Martin and Northrop Grumman in defense contracting, at $11.6 billion the largest merger ever
blocked on antitrust grounds at that time (1998); the acquisition of Primestar, a direct broadcast
satellite service, by several cable companies (1998); and the merger of Worldcom MCI and
Sprint in telephone and Internet services (2000).  In some respects, these are the most visible
merger enforcement actions of all: major deals that are not merely restructured, but flat-out
abandoned due to antitrust problems.
2.  Federal Trade Commission
One of the most important merger cases brought by the FTC was against Staples and
Office Depot, two office supply “superstores” that sought to merge in 1997.  The case was a
significant test of the “unilateral effects” theory described above.  The FTC, relying on extensive
econometric evidence showing that prices were lower in cities served by multiple office
superstores, claimed that this was a three-to-two merger in a market for office supply
superstores.  The parties asserted that the market included all suppliers of office supplies, and
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case, FTC strengthened merger enforcement by convincing a Court that direct evidence of
pricing effects could overcome more qualitative arguments about “reasonable substitutes” and
that have often been used by Courts to define antitrust markets.
One of the most sensitive mergers reviewed by the FTC was Boeing’s acquisition of
McDonnell Douglas.  In 1997, the FTC cleared this merger, despite the fact that Boeing’s share
of the market for large commercial aircraft was roughly 60%, and McDonnell Douglas was one
of only two rivals, the other being Airbus Industrie.  In a statement explaining their decision,
three Commissioners explained that they had not acted to further a “national champion,” but
rather had simply concluded that “McDonnell Douglas, looking to the future, no longer
constitutes a meaningful competitive force in the commercial aircraft market.”
30  The case
caused some tension across the Atlantic when the European Commission required that Boeing
modify some of its exclusive contracts with airlines as a condition for approving the merger.
Like the DOJ, the FTC experienced an acceleration of its merger enforcement duties in
the second Clinton term.  Generally speaking, the FTC displayed a far greater appetite to look for
behavior remedies in vertical cases than the DOJ, which was more inclined to simply let vertical
deals proceed forward.  Two of the most significant vertical mergers reviewed by the FTC were
the acquisition of Turner Broadcasting by Time Warner (1997) and the merger of AOL and Time
Warner in 2000.  In both cases, the FTC insisted on behavioral provisions before approving these
deals.
The FTC also found itself in the middle of a major consolidation in the oil industry
during the second Clinton term.  After extensive reviews, the FTC insisted on major divestitures
in the BP/Amoco merger (1998), the Exxon Mobil merger (1999) and the BP/ARCO merger
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from exploration and drilling (BP/ARCO in Alaska) to retail gasoline stations.  As usual, oil
industry mergers are highly visible and politically sensitive.  The FTC did not block any of these
mergers outright, but was aggressive in the divestitures sought.  For example, in the BP/ARCO
deal, the FTC insisted that BP divest ARCO’s entire Alaskan operations, on the theory that BP
had monopoly power in the sale of Alaskan North Slope crude oil on the U.S. West Coast, even
though the State of Alaska was satisfied that a much smaller divestiture would preserve
competition in bidding for exploration rights on the Alaska North Slope, and despite a consensus
among experts that the market for crude oil is a worldwide market, with no separate market for
Alaskan crude oil used on the U.S. West Coast.  After entering into litigation with the FTC, BP
agreed to the divestiture sought by the FTC, averting a trial.
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A final FTC case worthy of note is the FTC’s challenge to the proposed acquisition of
Beechnut’s baby food business by Heinz.  The FTC challenged this merger in 2000, expressing
concern that Heinz and Beechnut were the only two rivals to Gerber, the dominant supplier of
baby food in the U.S.  The merging parties argued that they would achieve significant
efficiencies by joining forces and thus be better able to take on Gerber.  The District Court
agreed with the parties on this point, and refused to grant a preliminary injunction blocking the
merger.  However, the FTC appealed this decision.  Such appeals are very rare, since most
merging parties lack the patience to appeal unfavorable merger decisions by the lower courts,
and the agencies at times choose not to appeal if the merger in question is consummated after a
request for preliminary injunction is denied.  Because they are so rare, decisions by the appeals
court on merger matters are highly influential.  In this case, Heinz and Beechnut were able to
hold their merger together through the appeals process.  In a blow to the “efficiencies defense” in
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efficiencies to offset the presumed reduction in competition based on the increase in
concentration in the market for baby food.  This case is significant because it raises the hurdle
even further for companies seeking to justify their merger based on achieving efficiencies.
Several major mergers were also abandoned in the face of a potential FTC challenge,
including Barnes & Noble’s proposed marriage with Ingram and the Air Liquide-Air Products
merger. As with threatened actions by the DOJ, the potential for challenge by the FTC also
discourages some anticompetitive mergers from ever seeing the light of day.
9.  The Rise in International Antitrust Enforcement in the Clinton Years
There is no doubt that antitrust enforcement became more international in scope during
the Clinton years.  For more detail on how U.S. companies and U.S. antitrust officials must be
mindful of international issues, see the final report of the  International Competition Policy
Advisory Committee (ICPAC), which was issued in February 2000.  The ICPAC was established
by the Attorney General in November 1997 to address global antitrust problems.
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The increasingly global nature of antitrust enforcement should be somewhat expected,
since the U.S. economy itself was become more integrated during these  years – as measured by
rising shares of imports and exports and capital flows as a share of total output (for more details,
see the chapter by Robert Lawrence in this volume).  Nonetheless, the international nature of the
enforcement agenda was surprising in one respect. Normally, one would assume that the greater
the competition from foreign imports, in particular, the more competitive pressure that would be
applied to domestic firms, and thus the need for antitrust scrutiny would be reduced. But while
this effect almost certainly did materialize, increasing cross-border economic activity led to a
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First, there were mounting numbers of highly visible mergers involving companies that
had international operations, and thus which triggered antitrust review in multiple jurisdictions –
especially Europe, where antitrust enforcement had been centralized since the early 1990s in the
European Commission. Some of the best known examples included several major
telecommunications alliances --British Telecom and MCI, and then with AT&T; Deutsche
Telecom and France Telecom with Sprint; MCI’s marriage with Worldcom; Boeing’s purchase
of McDonnell Douglas; and most recently, General Electric’s plan to acquire Honeywell (which
was blocked by the European Commission in July 2001).
Second, as we indicated earlier, the U.S. corporate amnesty program eventually
uncovered a number of price fixing conspiracies that were international in scope. Indeed, the
vitamins case – which resulted in the largest criminal antitrust fine in U.S. history – had a
number foreign defendants. However, there were other price fixing cases – notably, fax paper
involving Japanese defendants and dinner flatware involving Canadian defendants – where U.S.
authorities successfully mounted a court challenge (or agreed to a settlement) even though most,
if not all, of the evidence and illegal activity were located abroad.  Nonetheless, U.S. law is
sweeping in scope: well-established cases allow U.S. antitrust prosecution as long as the
offending activity adversely affects U.S. consumers. The problem of international cartels is not
simply a problem for the United States, but has been recognized as an important global issue
[WTO, 1997].
Third, both European and U.S. antitrust authorities have become involved in investigating
and prosecuting dominant firm abuses where the target of the investigation conducts business
and engages in similar activities in both jurisdictions. A prominent example is the first Microsoft
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and ultimately to a joint settlement – because the company did not want potentially inconsistent
rulings from both authorities [see Litan, 2000].  A more recent example is the initiation of an
investigation of Intel by the EC in 2001 after the FTC had conducted and then closed its own
investigation.  In this instance, the EC investigation apparently is proceeding without much U.S.
involvement or cooperation – a possible harbinger of things to come, as we note shortly.
Finally, the Clinton Justice Department carved out new ground in the international arena
when it acted on a potentially important policy change that was announced in 1992 under
Assistant Attorney General Rill: the prosecution of foreign defendants for taking steps outside
the U.S. that violated our antitrust laws in a way that harmed U.S. exporters¸ not just importers.
The initial target of this change in policy was a British company, Pilkington, which the DOJ
asserted had a dominant position worldwide in the provision of technology for the manufacturing
of glass. The Justice Department charged Pilkington with using exclusive territories and other
restrictive licensing practices to entrench its monopoly position.  Eventually,  the company
agreed to a consent decree to abandon these practices.
Where antitrust investigations or matters involve multiple jurisdictions it is appropriate –
indeed necessary – for U.S. authorities to cooperate with their counterparts in other countries. As
early as 1967, the OECD went on record urging such cooperation, a recommendation that has
been modified a number of times since [OECD, 1995]. U.S. antitrust authorities have followed
up this recommendation by entering into a number of bilateral cooperation agreements with
similar authorities in other countries, including Australia, Canada, the European Commission,
and Germany.  During the Clinton years, Brazil, Israel, Japan, and Mexico were added to this
list. Each of these agreements obligates the parties to notify the other of a pending investigation,
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other party, and outlines efforts to cooperate in actual investigations, to the extent permitted by
applicable law. None of these agreements, however, overrides domestic laws that prohibit the
sharing of confidential information without the consent of the target of the investigation. The
United States does have one other agreement, however, with Canada – a so-called “Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty” (or MLAT) – that allows the sharing of information obtained in criminal
investigations that otherwise might be confidential.
While these bilateral agreements have been important, they do not require the sharing of
all information nor can they compel testimony of foreign witnesses and any documents they may
have in their possession, unless home country authorities compel such production. The latter
shortcoming was arguably the main reason why the Justice Department failed to survive a
motion for directed verdict in the criminal price-fixing case it brought against General Electric in
1993-94 involving industrial diamonds. Shortly after that case, however, the Department was
more successful in persuading the Congress to authorize U.S. antitrust agencies to enter into
bilateral MLATs to share otherwise confidential information in civil cases. That authority was
granted in the International Antitrust Assistance Act, and the government has since entered into
such an agreement with Australia.
Given the relatively heavy volume of mergers and other investigations involving joint
jurisdiction with the European Commission (EC), much of the cooperative activity of the U.S.
authorities during the Clinton years was with the EC’s competition directorate, DG IV (now
known as DG-Comp).  By and large, the U.S. and the EC authorities saw eye-to-eye, with
perhaps the notable exception of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger, where the EC was
more insistent on conditions (which it eventually got, in the form of a ban on exclusive contracts
between Boeing and certain airlines).  In the first Microsoft investigation, Justice and ECLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 56
officials sat side-by-side in the negotiations with Microsoft that led to the first consent decree. In
other cases, notably the MCI-Worldcom merger, the U.S. authorities let the EC take the lead in
imposing conditions (a divestiture of Internet backbone operations).
While the trend toward increasing cooperation with foreign authorities exists, some rough
spots remain. In our view, the Justice Department during our tenure was somewhat frustrated
with what it saw as a less-than-aggressive posture by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission. The
Department also ruffled feathers abroad with its insistence on extraterritorial application of our
antitrust laws, not just in the Japanese fax paper case, but also in the Pilkington matter, where the
primary harm was to U.S. exporters in third-country markets rather than to U.S. consumers.
Meanwhile, European officials appear to be frustrated with the resistance of our antitrust
authorities to add antitrust harmonization to the list of issues to be negotiated under the auspices
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The main reason for recalcitrance on our part has been
a fear of U.S. officials that any international agreement could water down our own antitrust
standards. Nonetheless, shortly before he left office, Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein
endorsed a recommendation by an advisory board report that the U.S. seek to harmonize merger
reporting requirements so as to facilitate the review, approval, or where necessary, opposition of
authorities to mergers invoking the jurisdiction of multiple countries.
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Both antitrust and trade officials in the U.S. government have also been extremely
hesitant about putting antidumping reform on the trade agenda. Intellectually speaking, this is
difficult to justify. The antidumping law punishes behavior by foreign companies – selling below
average cost and engaging in price discrimination – that is lawful for domestic firms selling in
the U.S. market and certainly not in violation of U.S. antitrust law. Less developed countries, in
particular, have been fond of pointing this out and have insisted that antidumping policy reformLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 57
be added to the agenda of any future trade negotiating round.  U.S. trade officials, in both
Democratic or Republican Administrations, so far have strongly resisted such a course, almost
certainly because of the widespread political support that the antidumping laws have in
Congress. In our view, this is the reason that U.S. antitrust officials also have not pressed for
antidumping reform, or even not come close to suggesting any change in antidumping policy.
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Finally, it is possible that any material changes in antitrust policy during the current Bush
Administration will lead to more friction with antitrust officials abroad, especially in Europe,
where the Competition Directorate in recent years appears to have become even more aggressive
in antitrust enforcement. If this friction emerges, then major multinational companies that might
have anticipated benefits from a more relaxed antitrust enforcement policy in this country could
end up being sorely disappointed. At the same time, disagreements over antitrust policy between
the U.S. and Europe could make an already difficult trade relationship even more contentious.
Most recently, the July 2001 opposition of the EU to the proposed General Electric and
Honeywell merger –  a deal that was cleared by the DOJ with selected divestitures – has
occasioned significant comment, most of it adverse, from the U.S. press and political leaders.
Since the EC’s concerns are difficult to justify on traditional antitrust grounds,
35 the events
surrounding the GE/Honeywell merger could be the harbinger of further tensions between the
U.S. and European antitrust authorities in the future.
10.  Challenges Ahead: Antitrust in an Era of High-Tech
36
Looking ahead, questions have been raised about whether antitrust enforcement is up to
the challenges posed by certain aspects of what has come to be called the “new economy.” One
challenge grows out of the sheer speed of technological change, especially in the information
technology sector, where new generations of microprocessors have been doubling the speed ofLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 58
computers every 12 to 18 months. Ever faster computer chips lead to the creation and production
of every powerful personal computers and other chip-based devices, which in turn, require new
and more powerful software. Technological change in the biotech sector also seems
extraordinarily rapid, with potentially even more far-reaching benefits for society.
It is tempting to conclude that the quickened pace of technological change makes
antitrust irrelevant. If technology, firms and markets can change so rapidly, how long can any
single firm retain monopoly power? More to the point, given the relatively slow pace of the
judicial process – even after the relatively rapid trial in the Microsoft case, more than three years
elapsed between the filing of the government complaint and a decision by the Appeals Court, and
we still have no definitive judgment – how can antitrust enforcers expect to contribute more
good than harm when litigating?
There are several answers to this techno-pessimism about antitrust. One is that even in
face of rapid technological change, incumbent monopolies enjoy tremendous advantages that
make it difficult for new entrants to dislodge them even when technology advances. Microsoft,
for example, has maintained a monopoly in operating systems for personal computers for over a
decade.  Likewise, Intel has enjoyed a high share of desktop microprocessor sales for over a
decade.  Incumbents not only have the advantage of deep pockets, but they also can take
advantage of lead time in designing upgrades or new products that are “backward compatible”
with their preexisting versions. Accordingly, there is time for litigation – and often early
settlement – to make a real difference where monopolies are believed to be abusing their market
power.  The Appeals Court in the Microsoft case certainly did not back away from the
application of the antitrust laws in the rapidly changing software industry.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 59
A second answer is that rapid technological change underscores the importance of
antitrust in the review of mergers among firms in high-technology markets. An ounce of
prevention is worth more than a pound of cure when market conditions are subject to change.
Accordingly, mergers in high-tech markets should face an extra degree of scrutiny precisely
because the relative sluggishness of the judicial process makes it more difficult after-the-fact to
unscramble in a timely and meaningful fashion concentrations of market made possible by
merger power.
A  third answer concedes the problem that rapid change poses for antitrust enforcement
but then seeks to speed up the judicial process so that resolution of antitrust litigation can occur
much more quickly.  One approach, which is difficult to legislate but nonetheless should be
copied, is to conduct trials in the streamlined way in which the Microsoft trial was conducted.
That is, discovery can be limited, the parties can be confronted with a real, early trial date, and
the trial itself can be streamlined by limiting the number of witnesses each side is able to present.
Requiring all judges to conduct their litigations this way is difficult, if not impossible, to
mandate, as the experience with the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 has demonstrated.
37 But
Judge Jackson demonstrated in the Microsoft case that a major antitrust liability trial could be
conducted relatively quickly (even if he then got himself into trouble by attempting to impose a
structural remedy without sufficient evidentiary hearings and discussing the case with the press
after his decision).   Nonetheless, it is not clear that a lag of more than three years from
complaint to final judgment is truly workable and effective in high-tech industries.
Continued advances in technology undoubtedly will raise many more fascinating antitrust
issues in the years ahead. One of them is how the emerging business-to-business (“B2B”)
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treated by the antitrust authorities.  In theory, of course, joint ventures of this type pose the
dangers of collusion, not just among the competing buyers but also among the suppliers from
whom bids are sought, and so need to scrutinized carefully.  To give another current example,
American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, and United Airlines recently launched their Orbitz
venture to sell tickets on-line, over the strong objections of travel agents.  Will this venture
streamline ticket sales and cut out middlemen, or will it serve as an mechanism for collusion
among the airlines?
The Federal Trade Commission staff indicated in its October 2000 staff report that
antitrust concerns over B2B exchanges can usually be eliminated by adopting well-crafted
operating rules.  B2B exchanges are likely to pass muster as long as they meet a number of
conditions designed to ensure that pricing is transparent, that the price quotes are “firm” (and not
signals of what suppliers intend to charge), that confidential information is protected, and that
exchanges avoid being “over-inclusive” while also making sure that they are not used to exclude
buyers or suppliers from the market. At this writing, we are aware of no exchange that has failed
to meet these conditions.
We close simply by flagging two potentially broader and deeper issues that we believe
the antitrust authorities will inevitably be forced to deal with more and more frequently in the
years ahead: tying and intellectual property rights.
Tying is a storied topic in antitrust law and policy.  Traditionally, the courts and the
enforcement agencies have been very wary of commercial tying, whereby a company with a
dominant product (the tying product) sells that product only on the condition that buyers take
another of its products (the tied product).  The Microsoft case involved allegations of tying the
browser to the operating system. At this writing, Microsoft is nearing the launch of its newLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 61
operating system, XP, that integrates additional features, including Microsoft’s own audio and
video player, a “single passport” identification system for doing commerce on the Net, and other
features. The problem posed for antitrust authorities by such efforts at integration is to find
justifiable and easily administrable ways of distinguishing between a single, integrated product
(in which case there can be no tying) and two distinct products (in which case tying is possible).
The courts have struggled to fashion a broadly applicable rule to determine whether two distinct
“functions” are one product or two.  Is the browser part of the operating system?  Is the car radio
part of the car?  What about the tires or the engine?  The decision by the Appeals Court in the
Microsoft court offers considerable guidance regarding tying cases, even while sending the
Microsoft case itself back to the lower court on the tying claim.  Inevitably, however, by calling
for a rule of reason inquiry rather than a per se treatment, the Microsoft Court is insisting upon a
more complex, exhaustive, and time-consuming inquiry to be conducted.
Unfortunately, as recognized by the Microsoft Court, longstanding difficulties with tying
doctrine are likely to become more pronounced in various high-tech industries, especially given
the trends toward integrated products.
38  For example, Intel’s microprocessors and chipsets now
handle the functions that were handled by many more parts ten or twenty years ago.  Indeed, the
name “Intel” stands for “integrated electronics.”  The Microsoft court explicitly noted the
example of integration of the microprocessor with the math co-processor as an example of
apparently beneficial integration of two products into one.  If customers value integration, and
technology makes integration efficient, surely the antitrust laws should not stand in the way.
Worse yet, the boundary between one “functionality” and another is especially fussy in the
software industry.  We predict a number of sharp antitrust issues in the years ahead will revolve
around integrated products, interfaces, and the meaning of “tying” under antitrust law.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 62
Finally, we see a continuation of the clear trend towards a greater role for intellectual
property within antitrust.
39  As we noted above, patents, copyright, and trade secrets – not
production facilities or access to raw materials –increasingly are the key sources of competitive
advantage in the “knowledge economy.” This being the case, it is inevitable that owners of
intellectual property rights will push to the limit the advantages such rights confer upon them.
These limits are defined not only by the scope of the intellectual property rights themselves, but
by antitrust principles.  While former FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky and former Assistant
Attorney General Joel Klein were both keen to point out that the laws governing intellectual
property serve the same underlying goal as the antitrust laws – to promote innovation and thus
benefit our economy – there is no getting around the fact that tensions arise between these two
bodies of law.  We expect those tensions to be actively explored in the years ahead, either by the
private litigants or by the antitrust enforcement agencies.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 63
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1 The Clayton Act was amended in 1950, mostly to broaden its coverage of mergers.  The Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act further strengthened merger enforcement procedures in the 1970s.
2  In contrast, discounting by foreign suppliers selling into the U.S. market has often been attacked as illegal
“dumping.”  Conflicts between trade policy and antitrust policy are not uncommon, with antitrust officials
welcoming import competition as a check on the market power of domestic firms.
3 Areeda, at 575.
4 The competition policy laws in most foreign countries, while distinct, are no less vague.  Officials in other
jurisdictions, most notably the European Union, are actively exploring the limits of their enforcement authority and
interpreting their own statues as they fashion Competition Policy.  Since more and more firms, American and
foreign, are doing business both in the U.S. and abroad, and since the very same business practices (ranging from
Intel’s pricing and licensing strategies to the merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas) affect commerce around
the world, companies increasingly must be mindful of competition policy rules in multiple countries as they conduct
their business affairs.
5 See Evenett, et al. 2000. We discuss the substantive nature of this international antitrust enforcement
activity later in the chapter.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 65
                                                                                                                                                            
6 As developed by the courts, only those plaintiffs who have suffered “antitrust injury” – such as having
had to pay higher prices – can sue for damages. Under some circumstances, this limitation means that competitors of
a defendant may not have standing to sue.
7 This section draws heavily on Kovacic and Shapiro (2000).
8 A notable example is United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. (85 Fed. 271 [6
th Cir. 1898]).
9 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. (220 U.S. 373 [1911]). This case has since been much
criticized.  A general problem with the development of the law regarding vertical restraints of trade is that the courts
have attempted to take a distinction that makes sense in the horizontal realm – that between unilateral conduct and
“agreements” – and apply it in the vertical area, where buyers and sellers necessarily “agree” to do business.  In the
area of “vertical price fixing” the courts have struggled long and hard to draw a line between conduct that constitutes
an “agreement” between a manufacturer and a retailer versus conduct that is “unilaterally” imposed by the
manufacturer.
10 See Kovacic (1989) at 1134.
11 We do have some FTC data, but we lack a time series of FTC enforcement actions.  The FTC data are
from “Summary of Bureau of Competition Activity: Fiscal Year 1996 Through March 31, 2000,” pages 52-58.
During this three and one-half year period, the FTC reports the following merger enforcement activity:  nine
preliminary injunctions authorized, two Part III administrative complaints, 89 Part II consent agreements, 14 civil
penalty actions, and 34 transactions abandoned after a second request was issued, for a total of 148 merger actions.
On the non-merger side, there were five Part III administrative complaints, 31 Part II consent agreements, one civil
penalty action, and one injunction, for a total of 38 non-merger actions.  This same document lists all of these cases
and describes a number of them.  See http://www.ftc.gov/bc/abafy96thru00.pdf.  During the subsequent year ending
March 31, 2001, the FTC reports the following activity in the merger area: four preliminary injunctions, twenty
consent agreements, and seven mergers abandoned during the FTC investigation.  On the non-merger side, the FTC
obtained a $100 million consent judgment in one case (Mylan) and entered into eight consent agreements.  See
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/boastmollys.htm.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 66
                                                                                                                                                            
12 All of the FTC and DOJ guidelines and reports are available at their web sites, www.ftc.gov and
www.usdoj.gov/atr.   These sites also offer a wealth of information about specific antitrust cases brought by these
two agencies.
13 In addition, the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations were updated in 1995.
14 If the FCC does not approve a number of these applications in the near future, several influential
Members of Congress have vowed to seek legislation that would speed up such entry.
15 Indeed, the Department noted in its 1999 annual report [at 8] that the amnesty program at that point was
generating applications for amnesty at the rate of two per month.
16 Starting in FY1990, here are the total annual price-fixing fines collected by the Antitrust Division,
rounded to the nearest million dollars: $24, $20, $24, $40, $42, $40, $27, $205, $267, $1,107.
17 U.S. v. American Stock Exchange, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Pacific Exchange and Philadelphia
Stock Exchange, September 2000.  See http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/indx262.htm.
18 Both authors were involved in investigations of Microsoft when at the Antitrust Division, and Shapiro
has offered testimony as an expert witness for the government in the remedy phase of the trial.
19 For excellent overviews of the economics of the Microsoft case from different perspectives, see Gilbert
and Katz; Klein; and Whinston, all in the Spring 2001 issues of the Journal of Economic Perspectives.
20 The decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the Microsoft case is one of the most
significant antitrust decisions in recent years, and will have lasting implications for the application of the antitrust
laws in the software industry and beyond.  See http://msft.cadc.uscourts.gov/cadc/00-5212a.pdf.
21 Shapiro served as an expert witness on behalf of Intel in this proceeding.
22 Earlier, the Department of Transportation had proposed promulgating rules regarding the pricing and
frequency decisions of airlines at their hubs.  Meeting resistance by the larger carriers, these rules were never put
into place.  The DOJ case against American Airlines was an attempt to control aggressive behavior by hub airlines
using antitrust rather than regulation.
23 As usual in predatory pricing cases, the measurement of “marginal cost” or “average variable cost” is
both contentious and tricky.  In this case, the treatment of the cost of aircraft was a central issue.  DOJ sought to
have the opportunity cost of an aircraft, namely the profits that could be earned by flying that aircraft on anLitan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 67
                                                                                                                                                            
alternative route, included in the measurement of variable cost (at least when evaluating decisions to add more
flights to the routes in question).  Courts historically have been reluctant to include opportunity costs in their
measurement of incremental costs.
24 In June 2001, the DOJ announced that it would appeal the District Court’s ruling in the American
Airlines case.
25 Prior to the American Airlines case, the government had not brought a predatory pricing case for years.
Generally, the courts have become less and less receptive to predatory pricing cases over the past 25 years.
26 For a more complete discussion of these cases, see Gilbert and Tom (2001).  On the broader question of
the antitrust limits on settlements of patent disputes between direct rivals, see Shapiro (2001).
27 See Klein (1997) for a discussion of cross-licensing and patent pools, including a nice description of
airplane patent pool dating back to World War I, which was approved by the Justice Department.
28 During 1990-1992, an average of 1366 HSR filings were made per year.  During 1998-2000, an average
of 4584 HSR filings were made.
29 Data are taken from the Antitrust Division’s Annual Report for FY99.
30 See the Statement by Chairman Pitofsky and Commissioners Steiger, Starek and Varney at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/9707/boeingsta.htm.  Shapiro served as an outside economic consultant to the
Commission on the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger.
31 Shapiro served as an expert witness for BP and ARCO in this case.
32 The report is available on-line at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/icpac.htm.
33 Cite to International Advisory Report and to Klein’s endorsement.
34 One of us (Litan) has suggested a reform of the antidumping laws that would not require their repeal (and
replacement with just antitrust law): eliminating the cost of production test or changing it to penalize only sales
below average variable cost for goods bought from countries that have reasonably adequate antitrust enforcement
and that do not maintain significant barriers to the imports of the same goods. This modification is designed to
satisfy those who claim that an antidumping law is necessary to prevent firms in countries with closed markets from
“dumping” their goods abroad, and especially in our market. But if foreign markets are not really closed, then
arguably a different (more reasonable) antidumping test should apply. See Burtless, et al., 1998.Litan and Shapiro on Antitrust Policy, Page 68
                                                                                                                                                            
35 The European Commission opposed the merger in part on the grounds that GE would be able to offer
Boeing, Airbus, and others discounts on packages of GE engines and Honeywell avionics and other products.  The
Commission feared that this discounting would put pressure on rivals and ultimately create or strengthen a dominant
position by GE.  Needless to say, blocking a merger based on concerns that it will lead to discounting is not in the
mainstream of economic thinking about merger control policies, nor in keeping with U.S. antitrust law.  Shapiro has
provided economic assistance to GE and Honeywell during their merger review process.
36 This section draws on Litan (2001) and Shapiro (2000).
37 There was uneven adoption of expedited procedures in the ten “model” district courts that were funded to
experiment with ways to streamline their cases. The CJRA experience highlights the fact that procedural reform
depends almost exclusively on the willingness of particular judges to adopt such approaches as early trial dates and
limits on discovery and witnesses.
38 For one recent survey of the antitrust issues surrounding bundling in high-tech markets, see Sidak, 2001.
39 Gilbert and Tom (2001) document this trend nicely in the enforcement actions taken by the DOJ and the
FTC during the Clinton years.TABLE 1:
Sherman Act Violations Yielding a Fine of $10 Million or More





F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. (1999) Vitamins $500 International Switzerland
BASF AG (1999) Vitamins $225 International Germany
SGL Carbon AG (1999) Graphite Electrodes $135 International Germany
Mitsubishi Corp. (2001) Graphite Electrodes $134 International Japan
UCAR International, Inc. (1998) Graphite Electrodes $110 International U.S.
Archer Daniels Midland Co. (1997) Lysine & Citric Acid $100 International U.S.
Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd. (1999) Vitamins $72 International Japan
Daicel Chemical Industries, Ltd. (2000) Sorbates $53 International Japan
ABB Middle East & Africa Participations AG (2001) Construction $53 International Switzerland
Haarmann & Reimer Corp. (1997) Citric Acid $50 International German Parent
HeereMac v.o.f. (1998) Marine Construction $49 International Netherlands
Sotheby’s Holdings Inc. (2001) Fine Arts Auctions $45 International U.S.
Eisai Co., Ltd. (1999) Vitamins $40 International Japan
Hoechst AG (1999) Sorbates $36 International Germany
Showa Denko Carbon, Inc. (1998) Graphite Electrodes $32.5 International Japan
Philipp Holzmann AG (2000) Construction $30 International GermanyTABLE 1:
Sherman Act Violations Yielding a Fine of $10 Million or More
Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. (1999) Vitamins $25 International Japan
Nippon Gohsei (1999) Sorbates $21 International Japan
Pfizer Inc. (1999) Maltol/Sodium Erythorbate $20 International U.S.
Fujisawa Pharmaceuticals Co. (1998) Sodium Gluconate $20 International Japan
Dockwise N.V. (1998) Marine Transportation $15 International Belgium
Dyno Nobel (1996) Explosives $15 Domestic Norwegian Parent
F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. (1997) Citric Acid $14 International Switzerland
Merck KgaA (2000) Vitamins $14 International Germany
Degussa-Huls AG (2000) Vitamins $13 International Germany
Ueno Fine Chemicals Industry, Ltd. (2001) Sorbates $11 International Japan
Eastman Chemical Co. (1998) Sorbates $11 International U.S.
Jungbunzlauer International AG (1997) Citric Acid $11 International Switzerland
Lonza AG (1998) Vitamins $10.5 International Switzerland
Akzo Nobel Chemicals, BV & Glucona, BV (1997) Sodium Gluconate $10 International Netherlands
ICI Explosives (1995) Explosives $10 Domestic British Parent
Mrs. Baird’s Bakeries (1996) Bread $10 Domestic U.S.
Ajinomoto Co., Inc. (1996) Lysine $10 International Japan
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